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INTRODUCTION
The reduced vigor of antitrust enforcement in the United States
today, relative to the period before 1980, is bound up with the concept
of error costs.1 When the Supreme Court abandoned its longstanding
1. See Jonathan B. Baker, Taking the Error Out of “Error Cost” Analysis: What’s
Wrong with Antitrust’s Right, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 1–7 (2015) (discussing the significance of error cost analysis in antitrust and noting that it has led to the “circumscribing
or abandoning” of “antitrust’s concern with” a number of potentially anticompetitive
practices); Jonathan B. Baker, Economics and Politics: Perspectives on the Goals and Future of Antitrust, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2175, 2186–89 (2013) (“After more than three
decades during which antitrust rules were reworked to prevent them from chilling the
pursuit of production efficiencies, the risk that the antitrust rules will permit large
firms to exploit their market power to such a great extent that those rules will lose the
support of the consumer coalition has increased.”).
There is some evidence that this reduced vigor has led to increased market concentration across the economy and may be responsible for recent declines in the share
of GDP going to labor. See David Autor, David Dorn, Lawrence F. Katz, Christina Patterson & John Van Reenen, The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms, 135
Q.J. ECON. 645, 648–49 (2020) (reviewing evidence for the decline in labor’s share of
GDP and arguing that the decline is due to the rise of “superstar firms”); José Azar,
Ioana Marinescu & Marshall Steinbaum, Labor Market Concentration, J. HUM. RES. 19–
21 (2020), http://jhr.uwpress.org/content/early/2020/05/04/jhr.monopsony.1218
-9914R1.short?ssource=mfr&rss=1 [https://perma.cc/G3SW-YNDM] (demonstrating
a link between increasing market concentration and declining wages and suggesting
antitrust reforms to address the problem); Gustavo Grullon, Yelena Larkin & Roni
Michaely, Are US Industries Becoming More Concentrated?, 23 REV. FIN. 697, 700 (2019)
(“[O]ur findings demonstrate that industry concentration over the last two decades
has markedly increased.”). But see Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, Don’t Panic: A
Guide to Claims of Increasing Concentration, 33 ANTITRUST 74, 74–77 (2018) (arguing
that increases in market concentration in census data do not reflect increases in concentration in actual, properly-defined markets); Thomas A. Lambert, The Case Against
Legislative Reform of U.S. Antitrust Doctrine 6–11 (Univ. of Mo. Sch. of L., Research Paper No. 2020-13, 2020) (reviewing studies suggesting that literature identifying a
number of indicia of rising market power across the economy, including rising
markups, is inaccurate); THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 41–43,
232–33, 573 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2017) (arguing that the cause of labor’s declining share of income is not market imperfections but declining economic growth).
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per se rule against below-cost pricing by requiring that a plaintiff
show that the defendant could have recouped it losses, the justification the Court gave was fear of the consequences of erroneously condemning some benign price cutting.2 When the Court tossed the onehundred-year-old per se rule against manufacturer imposition of minimum resale prices on retailers, the reason the Court gave was the
danger of erroneously condemning “procompetitive conduct.”3 When
the Court refused to ban reverse payment patent settlements, in which
branded drug makers pay generic drug makers to stay out of drug
markets, the reason was the possibility of erroneously condemning
some welfare-enhancing settlements.4 And when the Court all but did
away with liability for refusals to grant access to an essential facility,
the ground was again the possibility of error.5
Error costs are of two kinds, those associated with the mistaken condemnation of
good conduct, which are known as over-enforcement, false positive, or Type I error
costs, and those associated with the mistaken failure to condemn bad conduct, which
are known as under-enforcement, false negative, or Type II error costs. The “type” language comes from the theory of statistical hypothesis testing. See, e.g., IRWIN MILLER &
MARYLEES MILLER, JOHN E. FREUND’S MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS WITH APPLICATIONS 377
(7th ed. 2011). The null hypothesis is that the effect of interest to the researcher does
not exist. In antitrust adjudication, the hypothesis is that conduct is procompetitive
and therefore no violation of the antitrust laws. Type I error exists when the null is
rejected despite being true. In antitrust adjudication, this means that the conduct is in
fact procompetitive, but this conclusion is incorrectly rejected and the conduct is condemned as anticompetitive. If a “positive” is a finding of anticompetitive behavior, then
it is a false positive. Type II error exists when the null is accepted despite being false.
In antitrust, this means that the conduct is in fact anticompetitive, but the conclusion
that it is procompetitive is accepted. If a “negative” is a finding that behavior is not
anticompetitive—that is, it is procompetitive—then a Type II error is a false negative.
See Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Error, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75, 79–81
(2010) (applying the terms to antitrust in this way); Baker, Taking the Error Out of
“Error Cost” Analysis, supra, at 5 (doing the same); Fred S. McChesney, Easterbrook on
Errors, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 11, 15 (2010) (doing the same).
2. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224,
226 (1993) (“[P]redatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful, . . . and the costs of an erroneous finding of liability are high.”).
3. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 894–95, 907
(2007) (refusing to impose a per se rule of illegality because doing so would preclude
a “significant amount of procompetitive conduct” and stating that per se rules of illegality “can be counterproductive. They can increase the total cost of the antitrust system by prohibiting procompetitive conduct the antitrust laws should encourage.”).
4. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 159 (2013) (“The existence and degree of any anticompetitive consequence may . . . vary . . . . These complexities lead us to conclude that the FTC must prove its case as in other rule-of-reason
cases.”).
5. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 407
(2004) (“To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power
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These cases, each representing a major defeat for antitrust enforcement delivered at least in part on error cost grounds, are the
product of an intellectual stalemate between two opposing schools of
antitrust thought, the Chicago School, which views erroneous over-enforcement of the antitrust laws as a major threat to the economy, and
the rather unimaginatively named Post-Chicago School, which views
erroneous under-enforcement as a greater threat to the economy.6 As
will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive
conduct.”).
6. See Baker, Taking the Error Out of “Error Cost” Analysis, supra note 1, at 6–7
(discussing error costs and conservative antitrust); George L. Priest, Bork’s Strategy
and the Influence of the Chicago School on Modern Antitrust Law, 57 J.L. & ECON. S1, S14–
16 (2014) (discussing the influence of the Chicago School on antitrust).
Why do the Chicago and Post-Chicago schools differ so dramatically on the nature
of antitrust error? Chicago believes that over-enforcement of the antitrust laws is dangerous because innovative behavior tends to look like anticompetitive behavior and
erroneous condemnation of innovative behavior could destroy economic growth. See
Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Innovation and the Limits of Antitrust, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 153, 167 (2010). According to Chicago, innovation can falsely appear to be anticompetitive because innovation destroys competitors who fail to keep
up. See id. at 176–77. But unlike truly anticompetitive conduct, argues Chicago, innovation is actually good for consumers, delivering them better products at lower prices,
and should not be a target of the antitrust laws. See id. at 168. The innovator who succeeds at reducing costs, and drops prices accordingly, to the great benefit of consumers, looks like a predatory pricer. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 509 U.S. at 226–27; Harold Demsetz, Barriers to Entry, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 47, 54
(1982). The manufacturer who insists that stores adhere to standard sales practices in
order to improve consumers’ shopping experience looks like an oppressor of retailers.
See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. at 890; Manne & Wright,
supra, at 190–91. The drug company that innovates in settling wasteful patent litigation, by paying generic drug companies to renounce their claims and thereby creating
savings that may be reinvested in improving drug effectiveness, looks like a divider of
markets with generic drug makers. See Robert D. Willig & John P. Bigelow, Antitrust
Policy Toward Agreements That Settle Patent Litigation, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 655, 656–
57, 656 n.3 (2004). The firm that refuses to share a technological advance that has
made consumers prefer the firm’s products over those of competitors looks like a denier of access to an essential facility. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407–08. In all these cases,
argues Chicago, condemning the conduct would be error, because the conduct is innovative and good for consumers. See Demsetz, supra, at 54; Manne & Wright, supra, at
190–91, 201; Willig & Bigelow, supra, at 656–57, 656 n.3.
For Chicago, the scary thing about the superficial resemblance between innovation and anticompetitive behavior is that innovation is not just good for consumers,
but is in fact the most important driver of consumer welfare and indeed of all economic
growth. See Manne & Wright, supra, at 168. This view appears to be quite general in
the economics profession as a whole. See William D. Nordhaus, Schumpeterian Profits
in the American Economy: Theory and Measurement 26–27 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,
Working Paper No. 10433, 2004); Robert M. Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function, 39 REV. ECON. & STAT. 312, 320 (1957); Moses Abramovitz,
Resource and Output Trends in the United States Since 1870, 46 AM. ECON. REV. 5, 13–14
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(1956). Banning conduct that appears anticompetitive but turns out to be innovative
would therefore have very high error costs. See Manne & Wright, supra, at 167.
By contrast, according to Chicago, letting a few bad actors get away with monopolizing markets likely would cause much less harm to consumers, because history has
shown that even the most entrenched monopoly position eventually erodes under the
force of new technologies and changing tastes. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of
Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 15 (1984). According to this argument, antitrust must therefore never ban a practice outright, and indeed should, given the risks, shut down as an
enterprise and simply let the miracle of the market do its work. See, e.g., Novell, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1076 (10th Cir. 2013) (Gorsuch, J.) (“If the [monopolization] doctrine [of no duty to deal] fails to capture every nuance, if it must err still to
some slight degree, perhaps it is better that it should err on the side of firm independence—given its demonstrated value to the competitive process and consumer welfare—than on the other side where we face the risk of inducing collusion and inviting
judicial central planning.”); Dialogue, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING
233, 235 (Harvey J. Goldschmid et al. eds., 1974) (“Phil Neal: Just to complete the record, I want to ask Professor Demsetz whether he would also repeal the Sherman Act.
[Harold] Demsetz: The answer is: as it is presently being carried out, yes.”). If the price
of having the iPhone is to allow Apple so much market power that Apple can amass
$268 billion in uncommitted cash, so much the better, given that the alternative would
be never to exit the flip phone age. See APPLE INC., FORM 10-K, at 21 (2017). Furthermore, the argument goes, Apple’s power will eventually disappear anyway, when the
next revolutionary communications technology comes along, rendering the
smartphone obsolete. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY
83–85 (Harper Torchbooks, 1976) (1942).
The Post-Chicago School has countered, however, that failing to condemn a bad
firm can take an even greater toll on innovation, by creating an economy of large firms
with little incentive to undermine their market positions by innovating. See Jonathan
B. Baker & Steven C. Salop, Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Inequality, 104 GEO. L.J.
ONLINE 1, 21 (2015) (“While raising concerns about false positives, the Court has not
analyzed the incidence and consequences of false positives, nor compared the resulting costs with the social benefits of antitrust enforcement or the incidence and consequences of false negatives and under-deterrence.”); Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of
Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375, 1386 (2009) (“Because a
rule-of-reason case is so costly to try, it is likely that fewer antitrust violations will be
challenged.”). Monopolies like Google and Facebook, argues this school of thought, can
stave off the competitive threat of new technologies by buying up nascent innovative
competitors like Nest and WhatsApp, eliminating the incentive of these companies to
continue to innovate, and insulating their new parents from any threat to their dominance. See Russell Brandom, The Monopoly-Busting Case Against Google, Amazon, Uber,
and Facebook, VERGE (Sept. 5, 2018, 8:14 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/9/5/
17805162/monopoly-antitrust-regulation-google-amazon-uber-facebook [https://
perma.cc/C7F3-6R3Y].
By contrast, according to this argument, inadvertently condemning good firms of
course has a cost, but so long as markets remain competitive, markets will continue to
generate innovative firms, and not all of these innovative firms will fall to antitrust’s
scythe. See Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusionary Conduct of Dominant Firms, R&D Competition, and Innovation, 48 REV. INDUS. ORG. 269, 270 (2016) (arguing that antitrust enforcement promotes innovation); Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY:
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 619–22 (Richard R. Nelson ed., 1962) (arguing that
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a result of this stalemate, the Court has resolved neither to roll back
antitrust enforcement, as Chicago would like, nor to ramp it up, as
Post-Chicago would like, but rather to tread carefully, by subjecting
virtually all antitrust-relevant conduct to what antitrust calls the rule
of reason.7 The rule stops a court from condemning conduct that
would otherwise violate the antitrust laws until the court is satisfied
that the challenged conduct harms consumers in the particular case at
issue.8 The rule of reason, in other words, is a license to engage in caseby-case adjudication.9
The rule of reason appears at first glance to provide a middle road
between strict enforcement of the antitrust laws and repeal.10 A caseby-case inquiry into consumer harm would seem to sidestep the entire question of error, and the attendant difficulty of determining
whether erroneous over-enforcement or erroneous under-enforcement is most harmful to consumers, by ensuring that errors simply do
not occur.11 In applying the rule of reason, courts take the time to

competitive markets create greater incentives for innovation). If the flip phone market
had not been competitive to begin with, the argument goes, there might not have been
an iPhone at all. A dominant firm like Nokia would have gobbled Apple up while the
iPhone was still a gleam in Steve Jobs’s eye. Inadvertently condemning a few other
smartphone innovators would not have been too high a price to pay for making the
iPhone possible.
7. See Timothy J. Muris, The New Rule of Reason, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 859, 859
(1988) (arguing that the only rule in antitrust is now the rule of reason); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 103–04 (1984) (suggesting that the rule of reason is to be applied in all cases other than the special case in
which the “likelihood of anticompetitive conduct [is] so great as to render unjustified
further examination of the challenged conduct”).
8. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779 (1999) (describing rule of reason analysis as requiring “plenary market examination”); id. at 781 (“What is required . . . is an enquiry meet for the case, looking to the circumstances, details, and
logic of a restraint.”).
9. See Stucke, supra note 6, at 1379.
10. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. at 103–04; Muris, supra note 7, at
859–61. For the proposition that it is effects on consumers that matter to antitrust, see
Steven C. Salop, Question: What Is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 336 (2010); and
John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting
Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191 (2008).
11. See Easterbrook, supra note 6, at 10, 15–16 (“We cannot condemn so quickly
anymore. What we do not condemn, we must study. The approved method of study is
the Rule of Reason.”); Manne & Wright, supra note 6, at 195 (describing replacement
of per se rules with rules of reason as “all to the good”).
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verify the existence of harm, ensuring, it would appear, that no mistakes are ever made.12
Embrace of the rule of reason has paradoxically led to the policy
of reduced enforcement advocated by Chicago, however, rather than
to the compromise in favor of greater accuracy in adjudication that the
Court seems to have intended, because case-by-case adjudication is
too expensive for enforcers fully to pursue.13 Thus every time the
Court considers some practice that would normally violate the antitrust laws in itself, and decrees that henceforth the effect of the practice on consumers must be considered in every case before liability
can attach, the Court has not improved the accuracy of adjudication
but rather effectively repealed the rule of illegality for that practice.
For enforcers lack the resources to investigate effects in each individual case and so they respond to the imposition of rules of reason by
bringing fewer cases.14
The effect of this budget constraint is written in the steep decline
in antitrust enforcement since the 1970s, when the Court started to
draw the rule of reason’s veil across the antitrust landscape.15 After
the Court added the recoupment requirement to predatory pricing
claims, which requires courts to take into account the long-term consequences for consumers of below-cost pricing, enforcers all but
stopped bringing cases.16 Ditto for monopolization claims under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which were once decided under the de facto
per se rule that was the essential facilities doctrine.17
12. See generally Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1367 (3d Cir.
1996) (“Whether a business arrangement unreasonably restrains trade is determined
by the courts, on a case-by-case basis, using a rule of reason which considers all relevant factors in examining a defendant’s purpose in implementing the restraint and the
restraint’s effect on competition.”).
13. See infra Part I.
14. See infra Part I. The connection between rules of reason and enforcement declines has long been a concern of antitrust proponents. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 80 (5th ed. 2016)
(“[M]any Progressive Era liberals believed that the rule of reason would greatly
weaken the Sherman Act . . . .”).
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 243
(1993); C. Scott Hemphill, The Role of Recoupment in Predatory Pricing Analyses, 53
STAN. L. REV. 1581, 1585 (2001) (“Probably due to the difficulty of winning a case, the
U.S. government seldom brings predatory pricing claims.”).
17. In 1972, for example, the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice
conducted twenty investigations for violations of section 2 of the Sherman Act and filed
thirteen cases, whereas in 1981 the agency conducted eight investigations and filed
one case, and, in the five years ending in 2019, the agency conducted an average of two
investigations per year and brought no cases over that period. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
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Post-Chicago scholars have rightly identified the rule of reason as
the cause of antitrust’s forty-year enforcement winter. But they have
placed far too much emphasis on how costly the rule makes it to win
cases and none on the equally important problem of how costly the
rule makes it to bring cases in the first place.18 As a result, Post-Chicago scholars have argued that the Court should adopt burden-shifting frameworks that force defendants to prove the absence of harm to
consumers, thereby delivering enforcers of the burden of proving the
presence of harm themselves.19 But that would do little to bring antitrust enforcement back from the dead if enforcers still bear the burden of sifting through the manifold of business experience to identify
consumer harm in order to find cases to bring. For even under a burden-shifting approach to the rule of reason, enforcers would still ultimately lose a case if defendants could prove the absence of consumer
harm, and so enforcers would continue to bear the cost of having initially to identify case-specific consumer harm in order to find winning
ANTITRUST DIVISION WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 1970-1979 (2015), https://www
.justice.gov/atr/antitrust-division-workload-statistics-fy-1970-1979 [https://perma
.cc/62SV-95A2]; U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ANTITRUST DIVISION WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 19801989 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/atr/antitrust-division-workload-statistics-fy
-1980-1989 [https://perma.cc/3U3F-6BZ7]; U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ANTITRUST DIVISION
WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 1990-1999, at 16, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/atr/legacy/2009/06/09/246419.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PGF-TQN5]; U.S. DEP’T
OF JUST., ANTITRUST DIVISION WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 2000-2009, at 17 (2012), https://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2012/04/04/281484.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3BYY-JZSB]; U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ANTITRUST DIVISION WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY
2010-2019, at 15, https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/788426/download [https://
perma.cc/2YE5-NDM9]. For the de facto per se rule that once applied to monopolization cases, see infra Part V. For skepticism regarding the use of case counts to measure
enforcement quality, see William E. Kovacic, Rating the Competition Agencies: What
Constitutes Good Performance?, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 903, 908–09 (2009).
18. See Stucke, supra note 6, at 1386; Peter Nealis, Note, Per Se Legality: A New
Standard in Antitrust Adjudication under the Rule of Reason, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 347, 370
(2000).
19. See Stucke, supra note 6, at 1483–87; Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason
and the Scope of the Patent, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 515, 549 (2015) (“Rather than placing
antitrust analysis into three silos dominated [sic] ‘per se,’ ‘quick look,’ and ‘rule of reason,’ it is better to think of the problem as setting proof requirements that vary with
the circumstances.”); AM. ANTITRUST INST., Restoring Monopolization and Exclusion as
Core Competition Concerns, in TRANSITION REPORT TO THE 45TH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES 10 n.40 (2016), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/
2018/12/Monopolizationfinal_0-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WM7-9D3H] (“[D]ifferent
tests may be appropriate for different categories of conduct, depending in part on the
potential costs of false positives and false negatives associated with the type of conduct.” (citing sources)). But see Nealis, supra note 18, at 380 (arguing in favor of applying the per se legality standard for section 1 antitrust cases); Devlin & Jacobs, supra
note 1, at 103.
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cases to bring. Every lost case is a waste of resources for enforcers
and, for government enforcers in particular, imposes prestige costs
that can lead even to the defunding of an agency.20 So the problem of
picking cases cannot be solved by bringing every case and letting the
cost of identifying consumer harm be shared through in-court burden
shifting. Enforcers must expend resources to find cases, and if they
lack the resources to do so, they will stop bringing them, whether good
cases, if brought, would be easy to win or not. The enforcement budget
constraint cannot be avoided through burden shifting.
Antitrust enforcement budgets, understood to include both the
budgets of government agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission and the budgets of private antitrust plaintiffs, have been declining, once adjusted for growth in the size of the markets that enforcers
police, since World War Two.21 But rules of reason, even after their
costs are reduced by burden-shifting reforms, will always be the most
expensive rules to enforce because rules of reason require enforcers
to identify consumer harm in addition to prohibited conduct when
choosing cases to bring.22 By contrast, the enforcement of conventional rules that prohibit conduct regardless of effects—called per se
rules in antitrust—requires only the identification of prohibited conduct. The Court’s conversion of many per se rules of illegality to rules
of reason starting in the 1970s has therefore driven up the costs of
enforcing the antitrust laws at a time when the enforcement budget
constraint has been tightening.23
By embracing rules of reason that enforcers cannot afford, and
consequently bringing about reductions in enforcement, the Court has
in effect committed itself to the Chicago view that it is better to let a
bad firm go free than to condemn a good one.24 But the Court does not
appear to have done this consciously. The Court has, at any rate, never
explicitly embraced such a position. If the Court would, when forced
consciously to pick a side in the stalemate, embrace the alternative
Post-Chicago view that the greater danger to consumers is to let a bad
firm go free, then the Court should not be leaving it to enforcers to
balance the enforcement budget by bringing fewer cases. Instead, the
20. See William E. Kovacic, Creating a Respected Brand: How Regulatory Agencies
Signal Quality, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 246, 253–54 (2015) (discussing the importance, to the building of an effective administrative “brand,” of “quality control” in
case selection by administrative agencies).
21. See infra Part II.
22. See Nealis, supra note 18, at 375.
23. See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text; see also infra Part IV.
24. See Manne & Wright, supra note 6, at 161.
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Court should balance the enforcement budget for each new expensive
rule of reason the Court adopts by substituting inexpensive per se
rules of illegality for expensive rules of reason in other areas of antitrust.25 That is, if the Court believes that under-enforcement is worse
than over-enforcement, then the Court should pay for any new rule of
reason the Court imposes on one area of conduct by making per se
illegal another area of conduct once subject to a rule of reason, rather
than by allowing enforcers simply to stop enforcing the antitrust laws
in other areas in order to set aside the funds needed to enforce the
new rule of reason. If the Court wants to subject predatory pricing to
a rule of reason, then the Court should, for example, ban reverse payment patent settlements.26 If the Court wants to subject minimum resale price maintenance to rule of reason treatment, then the Court
should, for example, eliminate rule of reason treatment for horizontal
mergers.27 If the Court wants to subject refusals to deal in essential
facilities to rule of reason treatment, then the Court should, for example, ban exclusive dealing contracts.28 And so on.
Of course, in consciously picking a side, the Court might well pick
the Chicago view, in which case the Court should adhere to the status
quo. But the Court must decide one way or another, and do so explicitly. The Court today presides over an antitrust regime that purports
to subject all suspect conduct to a meticulous, tailored examination for
harm that in practice looks more like desuetude, the Court all the
while seemingly ignorant of the striking divergence it has created between the law on the books and the law in action.29 This state of affairs
is untenable. The Court must either consciously embrace the Chicago
view that competition is the enemy of growth, or reject it, and start
ruling conduct per se illegal again.
Part I shows how the Court’s embrace of rules of reason is based
on a misunderstanding of decision theory because it fails to take the
cost of enforcing rules of reason into account. Part II uses historical
25. See Jonathan B. Baker, Evaluating Appropriability Defenses for the Exclusionary Conduct of Dominant Firms in Innovative Industries, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 431, 435
(2016) (arguing that failing to promote competition may harm innovation).
26. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 243
(1993) (imposing recoupment requirement); Ramsi A. Woodcock, Uncertainty and Reverse Payments, 84 TENN. L. REV. 99, 103 (2016) (calling for a rule of per se illegality for
reverse payment patent settlements).
27. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 632–35, 675–80 (discussing antitrust approaches to resale price maintenance and horizontal mergers).
28. See id. at 410–16, 587–99 (discussing essential facilities and exclusive dealing
law).
29. For more on this revolution in the law, see infra Parts IV–V.

2021]

A MODEST ANTITRUST

2105

data on the budgets of antitrust’s two main enforcers, the Federal
Trade Commission and the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division,
to show that enforcement budgets are not only constrained, but have
effectively been falling for decades, making the Court’s failure to take
budgets into account important. Part III argues that because the Court
does not distinguish the relative harmfulness of many categories of
antitrust-relevant conduct, such as price fixing and resale price
maintenance, the Court must treat all such categories of conduct as
equally harmful to consumers. That in turn makes it possible to characterize the Court’s embrace of rules of reason, and the resulting drop
in antitrust enforcement by budget-constrained enforcers, as either
good for consumers, if the Court believes these categories of antitrustrelevant conduct to be mostly good, or bad for consumers, if the Court
believes these categories of antitrust-relevant conduct to be mostly
bad for consumers.
Parts IV and V look in detail at the actual changes to the antitrust
laws brought about by the Court over the past forty years and argue
that the Court made these changes out of a naïve desire to increase
accuracy in adjudication, rather than because the Court believes that
antitrust-relevant conduct is mostly good for consumers and therefore enforcement should be reined in. Part VI argues that the Court’s
embrace of rules of reason amounts to the favoring of standards over
rules and shows how unusual the Court’s embrace of standards in the
antitrust context is in comparison to the approach taken by courts in
other areas of law. Part VII describes in detail the model of error costs
subject to an enforcement budget constraint that powers the arguments in this Article, discusses some assumptions of the model, uses
the model to map out the error cost effects of all possible rule changes,
and uses that map to show that in a recent case the Court may have
increased error costs in counterintuitive fashion. Part VIII argues that
even if the rule of reason is reformed to solve the problem of pro-defendant bias identified by other scholars, the error costs created by
the enforcement budget constraint will persist and can only be addressed through the application of per se rules. Part IX, the Appendix,
presents the error cost model that serves as the basis for this Article
in mathematical and graphical terms.
I. THE RULE OF REASON PRESUMPTION
The Court today adheres to a powerful presumption in favor of
the rule of reason approach to anticompetitive conduct: the Court will
impose a per se rule of illegality on conduct only when there is no
chance of error, meaning that the Court will impose a per se rule of
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illegality only when the conduct is so obviously harmful to consumers
that the rule of reason’s case-by-case analysis would end in the proscription of all, or nearly all, of the conduct anyway.30 As Justice White
put it in Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broadcasting System, a 1979 case
that, more than any other, heralded the triumph of the rule of reason
presumption, only a practice that “facially appears to be one that
would always or almost always tend to restrict competition” should
be per se illegal.31 This extraordinary requirement of near-complete
evil before the Court will impose a rule of per se illegality on conduct
is responsible for the spread of the rule of reason across the antitrust
landscape, because all conduct is fundamentally ambiguous in effect,
capable of good as well as ill, and therefore incapable of meeting the
very high bar set by the Court for prohibition.32
It should be no surprise, then, that only one per se rule of illegality
in antitrust has survived the introduction of the rule of reason presumption, or that its survival is due more to a willingness in the Court
to dodge the presumption rather than to apply it faithfully. The Court
has preserved the per se rule against price-fixing only because the
Court has been willing to pretend, in the teeth of the facts, that a prohibition on price-fixing is error cost free.33 In fact, economists have
long acknowledged that price fixing can be good for consumers when
it staves off ruinous competition, such as price wars that drive prices
below costs.34 So it is difficult to view as anything but make-believe
30. See, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 103–04 (1984) (“Per se rules are invoked when surrounding circumstances
make the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct so great as to render unjustified further examination of the challenged conduct. But whether the ultimate finding is the
product of a presumption or actual market analysis, the essential inquiry remains the
same—whether or not the challenged restraint enhances competition.”); Bus. Elecs.
Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726 (1988) (“[T]here is a presumption in favor
of a rule-of-reason standard . . . .”); Muris, supra note 7, at 859–60 (marking the rise of
this approach); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 39–40 (2d ed. 2001).
31. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979);
Muris, supra note 7, at 859–60 (arguing that BMI heralded the demise of the per se
approach to antitrust). For a collection of Supreme Court pronouncements to similar
effect, see the Court’s discussion in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.,
485 U.S. at 723–24.
32. For the extent of that spread, see infra Parts IV–V.
33. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218–28 (1940)
(making price fixing per se illegal); Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332,
362 (1982) (limiting the ban on price fixing to naked restraints). Related practices,
such as market division, also remain per se illegal. See United States v. Topco Assocs.,
Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 605, 608 (1972).
34. See MICHAEL D. WHINSTON, LECTURES ON ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 16–17, 38
(2008); HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 255.
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the Court’s statement in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society,
the 1982 case that saved the per se rule against price fixing from the
error cost onslaught, that “claims of enhanced competition are . . . unlikely to prove significant in any particular” price-fixing case.35 The
real reason for which the Court retains the per se rule against pricefixing is likely the Court’s unwillingness to deprive antitrust entirely
of the semblance of law by adopting the policy-like case-by-case analysis of the rule of reason across the board.36
The world of the rule of reason presumption is very different
from the one that prevailed before the rise of the presumption in the
1970s. Back then, the Court was quite comfortable with the notion
that a per se rule against a particular category of conduct might incidentally proscribe a substantial amount of virtuous conduct. In United
States v. Socony Vacuum, the case credited with establishing the per se
rule of illegality for price fixing in its modern form, Justice Douglas
wrote that price fixing is illegal per se “whether or not particular
price-fixing schemes are wise or unwise, healthy or destructive.”37
Moreover, the Court during that period appeared to understand that
the purpose of imposing per se rules of illegality is to manage enforcement costs, the burgeoning of which under rules of reason is a cause
of antitrust’s contemporary decline.38 In Northern Pacific Railway Co.
v. United States, for example, the Court observed that making conduct
per se illegal “avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and
prolonged economic investigation” as part of the rule of reason.39 Indeed, at the same time that the Court in Maricopa sought to fit per se
treatment for price fixing into the straitjacket of always-harmful conduct, the Court cited cases from this earlier era in acknowledging that
the “costs of judging business practices under the rule of reason . . .
have been reduced by the recognition of per se rules.”40
The rule of reason presumption is the product of an appeal by the
Court to an approach to adjudication associated with the field of decision theory.41 The work of economists, psychologists, and
35. Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. at 351. For the significance of
Maricopa, see ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, JONATHAN B. BAKER & JOSHUA D.
WRIGHT, ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS, AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION
POLICY 147–53 (3d ed. 2017).
36. See Baker, Taking the Error Out of “Error Cost” Analysis, supra note 1, at 3–4;
Nealis, supra note 18, at 374–75.
37. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 221.
38. See infra Parts II, V.
39. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1958).
40. Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. at 343–44.
41. For background on the movement of decision theory into the law, see Baker,
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philosophers interested in identifying conditions for rational decisionmaking, decision theory requires that decisionmakers alter their
decision rules based on the amount of available information in order
to optimize the use of limited decisional resources.42 According to decision theory, if courts know that the conduct at issue is almost always
harmful, courts should make the conduct per se illegal, or give the defendant only a very limited opportunity to rebut a presumption of illegality, thereby freeing up enforcement resources to direct to hard
cases.43 If, however, courts have little information regarding the harmfulness of the conduct, then decision theory requires that courts allow
plaintiff and defendant to litigate the harmfulness of the conduct in
depth.44 According to decision theory, the amount of scrutiny to be applied to a given case should be determined by balancing the costs of
additional scrutiny against the potential benefits to consumers associated with more accurately determining the existence or non-existence of harmful conduct.45
In National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, the Court translated this decision-theoretic perspective into law by arguing that there is no such thing as a per se rule—
whether of illegality or legality—in antitrust.46 Instead, argued the
Court, there is only a rule of reason that embodies decision-theoretic
principles, authorizing more searching scrutiny in ambiguous cases
and less-searching scrutiny in clearer cases.47 Per se rules, argued the
Court, are an illusion created when the rule of reason encounters a
particularly clear-cut case.48 When conduct is unambiguously harmful, the rule of reason requires that the conduct be condemned without further inquiry, and that creates the impression that the conduct
is subject to a per se rule of illegality.49 Similarly, when conduct is
Taking the Error Out of “Error Cost” Analysis, supra note 1, at 4, which cites sources.
42. See MARTIN PETERSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO DECISION THEORY 3, 5–6 (2009).
43. See Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 1, at 110.
44. See C. Frederick Beckner III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust
Rules, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 41, 45–47 (1999).
45. See id.
46. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S.
85, 103–04 (1984); Spencer Weber Waller, Justice Stevens and the Rule of Reason, 61
SMU L. REV. 693, 703–16 (2009) (tracing doctrinal origin of this “unitary” rule of reason theory to the work of Justice Stevens).
47. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S.
at 103–04; Waller, supra note 46, at 700–01, 704–07.
48. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S.
at 103–04; Waller, supra note 46, at 700–01, 704–07.
49. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S.
at 103–04.
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unambiguously good for consumers, the rule of reason requires that
the Court desist from condemning the conduct, without further inquiry, and that creates the impression that the conduct is per se legal.
But the Court can act decisively, without further inquiry in both cases,
only because the conduct is known to the Court to be either always
harmful to consumers, in the case of conduct that the Court condemns,
or always good for consumers, in the case of conduct that the Court
does not condemn.50 When conduct is unambiguous in either of these
ways, no prolonged inquiry into effects takes place because the rule of
reason, operating according to decision-theoretic principles, requires
that none take place, not because the conduct is subject to some separate rule of per se legality or illegality.51
The Court got decision theory only half right. While the Court correctly suggested that decision theory requires that courts should
sometimes engage in a more searching investigation of conduct and at
other times should engage in a less searching investigation, the Court
left out consideration of the factor that in decision theory determines
when more investigation is warranted and when it is not: the costs of
the additional investigation in relation to the benefits, in terms of
greater accuracy in adjudication, of the additional investigation. Missing from the Court’s application of decision theory to antitrust law is
attention to the problem of how optimally to allocate decisional resources that is the whole point of the decision-theoretic project.52
That lacuna allowed the Court to make the unwarranted step from recognizing that courts should summarily dispose of unambiguous conduct to concluding that courts should subject all ambiguous conduct
to more searching scrutiny.53 The careful decision theorist, by contrast, recognizes that searching scrutiny of ambiguous conduct is
costly, and therefore budget constraints may sometimes force use of a
per se rule of illegality, or a per se rule of legality, as a low-cost alternative to a rule of reason. The use of per se rules in such a situation
may, despite the rules’ imprecision, still result in lower error costs
than would the other alternative of searching rule of reason review of
the conduct for actual harm.54
50. See id.
51. See id.; Waller, supra note 46, at 700–01, 704–07.
52. See Beckner & Salop, supra note 44, at 44 (“[T]he court must be mindful of the
financial, time, and management costs that it is inflicting on the parties [including third
parties] and itself.”); Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 1, at 103.
53. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S.
at 103–04.
54. See Beckner & Salop, supra note 44, at 47.
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The proper decision theoretic approach to ambiguous conduct—
conduct that is not known to the Court from the outset of a case to be
always good or always bad—is a multi-step process.55 First, the Court
must understand the costs associated with the various levels of scrutiny of the challenged conduct that the Court has available to use.56 In
particular, the Court must recognize that the highest level of scrutiny—the rule of reason—is also the most costly.57 Rules of reason are
more expensive than per se rules of legality, of course, because rules
of per se legality require enforcers only to identify the conduct subject
to the rule and then do nothing.58 Rules of per se illegality are more
costly to enforce than rules of per se legality, because, in addition to
identifying the conduct, enforcers must then bring a case and obtain a
remedy.59 But the rule of reason is more costly to enforce than rules
of per se illegality, because the rule of reason puts enforcers in the position of having both to identify the conduct subject to the rule (e.g.,
minimum resale price maintenance) and to determine whether the
conduct harms consumers.60
The second step in the decision process is for the Court to determine how the cost of each possible level of scrutiny will be covered.61
Assuming a fixed enforcement budget constraint, employing a rule of
reason to evaluate conduct formerly subject to a rule of per se illegality or legality, both of which are less expensive than a rule of reason,
will require a change in approach to other conduct to free up room in
the budget for the rule of reason. If, for example, the Court wishes to
apply the rule of reason to conduct formerly subject to a per se rule of
illegality, the Court must convert rule of reason treatment of some
other conduct to a per se rule of some kind, or convert a per se rule of
illegality to a per se rule of legality, or engage in some combination of
these two types of rule conversions, in order to free up enforcement
resources to pay for the new rule of reason.
Finally, the Court must consider whether any increase in error
costs arising from the compensating rule change required to pay for
the new rule—the loss of accuracy in prohibiting harmful conduct associated with converting a rule of reason to a per se rule of legality, for
example—are offset by the reduction in error costs associated with
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See id. at 43–61.
See id. at 55–57.
See Stucke, supra note 6, at 1460–65; Nealis, supra note 18, at 367–70.
Cf. Nealis, supra note 18, at 367–70.
Cf. Stucke, supra note 6, at 1466.
Cf. id. at 1460–65.
See Beckner & Salop, supra note 44, at 55–57.
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the Court’s adoption of the new rule for the conduct at issue. If the rule
changes required to pay for a new rule create more error costs than
the new rule eliminates, then of course the Court should not adopt the
new rule.62
The failure of the Court to take enforcement costs into account
has led to perhaps the most overlooked consequence of the error cost
revolution in antitrust: that it has fallen to enforcers to balance budgets swelled to bursting by all the new rules of reason forged by the
Court out of old per se rules of illegality.63 Unlike the Court, which can
demote a rule of reason to a per se rule of illegality to reduce enforcement costs, enforcers can only reduce their costs in one way: by reducing enforcement, which is to say, by creating de facto rules of per
se legality.64 In failing to make budget balancing rule changes to compensate for the rules of reason that it has imposed in recent decades,
the Court has therefore ensured that only de facto rules of per se legality have been used to pay for those rules of reason, because enforcers cannot unilaterally impose the other low-cost approach to adjudication—rules of per se illegality—unilaterally. The Court has thereby
injected a stark bias in favor of non-enforcement and de facto per se
legality into antitrust through its half-baked embrace of the rule of
reason presumption. The Court’s conversion of the per se rule against
resale price maintenance to a rule of reason, for example, imposed a
burden on enforcers who, if they took their jobs seriously, were henceforth forced to scrutinize all individual instances of resale price
maintenance for harm to consumers in order to find resale price
maintenance cases to bring.65 In order for cash-strapped enforcers actually to carry out that task, they necessarily had to reduce the care
with which they would otherwise troll the seas of antitrust-relevant
conduct for cases, either with respect to the conduct subject to the rule
of reason, other conduct, or some of both.66 Enforcers might, for
62. Id. at 47.
63. For example, there is no discussion of balancing enforcement budgets in
Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 1.
64. See Nealis, supra note 18, at 369–70.
65. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 907 (2007).
66. Baker & Salop, supra note 6, at 18 (“Because every enforcement action has an
opportunity cost, the agencies limit the intensity of their enforcement efforts and have
to pick and choose which matters to pursue. They similarly are constrained in their
ability to litigate multiple cases against deep-pocketed defendants, which may lead
them to accept weaker settlements. Private plaintiffs add additional enforcement capacity, but they cannot employ the investigative tools available to the government, so
they have less ability to uncover and challenge many types of anticompetitive conduct.”); William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Common Law Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661, 661 (1981) (then-head of the
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example, have relied on their prosecutorial discretion to quit enforcing the Robinson-Patman Act (which, perhaps not coincidentally, enforcers actually have quit enforcing in recent decades).67 The resulting
tradeoff—more careful scrutiny of resale price maintenance for the de
facto repeal of the Robinson-Patman Act—would have been good for
consumers, however, only if the harm to consumers of no longer condemning the supply-price discrimination prohibited by the RobinsonPatman Act were offset by the benefits to consumers of more accurate
enforcement against firms engaged in resale price maintenance.68
It will become clear in Part III that it might well be optimal for the
Court to pay for all the new rules of reason it has created in recent
decades exclusively by converting preexisting rules of reason to per
se rules of illegality—something that enforcers cannot do alone because they lack authority to change the law—and never to create rules
of per se legality, either formally or by putting cash-strapped enforcers in the position of having to reduce enforcement. In that case, the
Court’s adoption of rules of reason without making compensating
budget-balancing rule changes, and the consequent increase in nonenforcement, have harmed consumers.
II. THE BUDGET CONSTRAINT
The Court’s naiveté regarding enforcement costs is a problem because enforcement budgets have failed to keep up with economic activity for a long time.69 Enforcement budgets of the U.S. Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have increased in both absolute and inflation-adjusted terms since the 1970s, when error cost
thinking stormed antitrust.70 That tells little about whether enforcers
have actually had the funds to apply the new rules of reason imposed
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice arguing that fully enforcing the antitrust laws “would require the Division to shoulder obligations that, given its limited
resources, it could not possibly discharge in an effective manner”).
67. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 775 (noting that the Department of Justice
“has not enforced the Act since 1977, and the Federal Trade Commission largely ignores it as well”).
68. See Beckner & Salop, supra note 44, at 45–46.
69. The remarks that follow are based on budget data compiled by the author
from the following sources: FTC Appropriation and Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) History,
FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices/office-executive-director/
financial-management-office/ftc-appropriation [https://perma.cc/WQL9-T78E]; Appropriation Figures for the Antitrust Division, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/
atr/appropriation-figures-antitrust-division [https://perma.cc/FF4H-3M5V]; Budget
of the United States Government, FED. RSRV. BANK ST. LOUIS: FRASER, https://fraser
.stlouisfed.org/title/54 [https://perma.cc/V89U-6P4B].
70. See Baker, Taking the Error Out of “Error Cost” Analysis, supra note 1, at 2–4.
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by the Court since that time, however, because the economy also grew
over that period.71 As the economy grows, the amount of conduct that
falls within the ambit of any given antitrust rule must grow as well. A
larger economy means more transactions the prices of which may be
fixed, more business that may be foreclosed through exclusive dealing,
and more markets that may be dominated through merger, for example. Enforcement budgets must therefore expand with the economy to
permit policing of the additional conduct created by economic
growth.72 To accommodate all of the shifts from less expensive rules
of per se illegality to more expensive rules of reason adopted by the
Court since the 1970s, enforcement budgets would have needed not
only to match economic growth, but to outpace economic growth
since that time.73
Enforcement budgets have not only failed to outstrip economic
growth since the 1970s, however, but have, with brief exceptions, in
fact failed to grow with the economy since World War Two. Figure 1
shows that, after adjustment for GDP growth, antitrust enforcement
budgets are currently lower as a share of GDP than they have been
since 1908, and one seventh of what they were at their peak in 1942.
Growth in the productivity of enforcers, which would allow them to
monitor more conduct and construct cases at lower cost, does not explain this trend. The economic growth numbers used to construct Figure 1 have been deflated by the growth in total factor productivity of
federal government administration from 1960 to the present, the period over which the information revolution might have been most
likely to strengthen the enforcement powers of the antitrust agencies.
The effect of growth in government productivity is minimal, however,
and the decline in the effective budget shown in Figure 1 remains pronounced.74 If enforcement budgets have failed to keep up with costs,
71. See Measuring Worth GDP Result, MEASURING WORTH, https://www
.measuringworth.com/datasets/usgdp [https://perma.cc/C3VR-J9DW].
72. Professor Kwoka also worries that enforcement budgets lag economic
growth. John E. Kwoka, Jr., Commitment to Competition: An Assessment of Antitrust
Agency Budgets Since 1970, 14 REV. INDUS. ORG. 295, 296 (1999) (“[T]he increase in antitrust enforcement resources over the past thirty years has been far more modest than
most measures of economic activity or of events such as mergers that are reviewed by
the agencies.”).
73. For more detail on these rule changes, see infra Parts IV–V.
74. See Dale W. Jorgenson, Mun S. Ho & Jon D. Samuels, Information Technology
and U.S. Productivity Growth: Evidence from a Prototype Industry Production Account,
36 J. PRODUCTIVITY ANALYSIS 159, 163–64, 168, 170 (2011) (discussing information
technology innovation since 1960, characterizing federal government administration
as an IT-using industry, and providing an average annual productivity growth rate for
said industry). Professor Kwoka considers whether enforcement productivity
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then enforcers must have been forced by adoption of all the new rules
of reason to reduce the amount of antitrust-relevant conduct that they
actually monitor. That in turn means that there has been a growth
over this period in the amount of conduct subject to a de facto rule of
per se legality.

Aggregate DOJ and FTC Antitrust
Enforcement Budget Adjusted for
Inflation, GDP, and Federal Government
Productivity Growth, 1908-2015
(in billions of 2009 U.S. dollars)
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Figure 1

increases account for the failure of budgets to keep up with growth in economic activity and concludes that they do not. Kwoka, supra note 72, at 296–97 (suggesting that
“more talented staff, superior computing technologies, and procedures such as the
Merger Guidelines that systematize analysis” might have increased enforcement
productivity).
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The value for each year represents the budget that would be required
to purchase an equivalent amount of enforcement in 2009 given the
change in the size of the economy and taking into account changes in
federal government productivity since 1960 due to progress in information technology.

The ebb and flow of effective, GDP-adjusted, enforcement budgets tracks the intellectual history of antitrust with remarkable precision. Effective budgets were high in the second decade of the twentieth century when antitrust was a major issue in a presidential election
and the FTC came into being.75 Budgets then fell to a trough in the
early 1930s, when it was thought for a time that concentration is efficient and antitrust enforcement was out of favor.76 This policy reversed in the 1930s with the appointment of Thurman Arnold to head
the Antitrust Division, and by the 1940s budgets reflected the renewed interest in enforcement.77 Budgets remained stable from the
1950s to the 1970s, during antitrust’s golden age, even spiking briefly
in the late 1950s, a moment that many would date as the apex of postwar antitrust enthusiasm.78 Then, in the 1970s, the Chicago School
succeeded at convincing Congress, though not the Court, that a substantial amount of conduct that was then treated as per se illegal was
actually good.79 (The Court preferred to remain agnostic by subjecting
the conduct to rules of reason—an approach that, as this Article relates, turned out not to be as neutral as it seems—but Congress went
further, slashing enforcement budgets on the assumption that much
antitrust-relevant conduct does not actually harm consumers.80)
75. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 80 (stating that there was “great interest in
antitrust during the 1912 Presidential election” and that the Wilson administration
created the FTC).
76. See id. at 81 (observing that this view “temporarily won out during the New
Deal” and “Roosevelt’s ‘Codes of Fair Competition’ virtually legalized various forms of
collusion”).
77. See id. (stating that “Roosevelt changed course” with the appointment of
Thurman Arnold).
78. See Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy in Crisis: 1890–
1955, 94 MINN. L. REV. 311, 354–59 (2009) (describing the sometimes “harsh” antitrust
rules of this period). Effective budgets appear to have been lower in the postwar period
than they were during and immediately before the war because postwar budgets failed
to keep up with surging economic growth.
79. See id. at 360–63.
80. See Jonathan B. Baker, Competition Policy as a Political Bargain, 73 ANTITRUST
L.J. 483, 506 (2006) (“Budgets at the federal antitrust agencies declined substantially
during the 1980s, and staffing fell by nearly half.”).
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Effective enforcement budgets plunged accordingly to the current
trough.81
Private enforcement budgets are not included in Figure 1, but private enforcement budget data would likely tell a similar story. Private
enforcement budgets, which are the funds that plaintiff attorneys generate through the contingency fees they extract from damages awards
in antitrust cases, increase when new categories of once-per-se-legal
conduct are brought under antitrust scrutiny, giving plaintiffs damages remedies for conduct for which no remedies were available before.82 Thus private enforcement budgets would have increased during and after World War Two when the Court expanded the scope of
many antitrust rules.83 Private enforcement budgets do not increase,
however, when the Court converts rules of per se illegality to rules of
reason, because the remedy is not affected by such rule changes.84 A
firm found liable for minimum resale price maintenance in a private
action when minimum resale price maintenance was per se illegal
faced the same remedy—including, for example, trebled damages—as
would a firm held liable today under the current rule of reason standard for resale price maintenance.85 As a result, when conduct once
subject to a per se rule of illegality becomes subject to a rule of reason,
plaintiff lawyers have nothing more to gain from bringing a case than
they did before, even though the cost of identifying a winning case to
bring has gone up. So there is no reason to suppose that the conversion of per se rules of illegality to rules of reason since the 1970s has
been accompanied by an increase in private enforcement budgets. Indeed, there is reason to suppose that private enforcement budgets
81. See Figure 1.
82. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (authorizing private antitrust suits for treble damages);
HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 804–06; Thomas E. Kauper & Edward A. Snyder, An Inquiry into the Efficiency of Private Antitrust Enforcement: Follow-on and Independently
Initiated Cases Compared, 74 GEO. L.J. 1163, 1220 (1986) (“[T]he rationale for a treble
damages remedy encompasses not only the policies of compensation and deterrence,
but also the need to provide incentives to private parties to encourage litigation to detect and prevent continuing violations.”); Warren F. Schwartz, An Overview of the Economics of Antitrust Enforcement, 68 GEO. L.J. 1075, 1092 (1980) (recognizing that the
level of private damages determines the intensity of private enforcement); Spencer
Weber Waller, The Incoherence of Punishment in Antitrust, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 207,
210–11 (2003) (noting use of contingency fee structure in private antitrust actions).
83. See Sandeep Vaheesan, The Evolving Populisms of Antitrust, 93 NEB. L. REV.
370, 383–95 (2014).
84. A proposal to do that failed. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 887–88 & n.47
(noting that a Reagan administration proposal to limit treble damages to violations of
per se rules was never implemented and arguing that defeat was the right result).
85. See id. at 886–88.
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have fallen, because during this period the Court has explicitly created
a number of rules of per se legality, effectively withdrawing some conduct from antitrust scrutiny and therefore reducing the terrain over
which plaintiff lawyers can bring and win cases and thereby generate
the funds to bring more cases.86 Any budget decline must have been
exacerbated by a fall, since the 1970s, in the amount of damages
courts have been willing to award to successful plaintiffs, and by the
Court’s imposition of scope of liability rules that have made it harder
for plaintiffs to get into court to enforce antitrust rules under any
standard.87
Of course, it is possible that enforcement budgets have always
been large enough to absorb the cost of the application of rules of reason, even across the board. But believing that would require adherence to the belief that the effective enforcement budget near the dawn
of the antitrust laws in 1908, which was higher than the effective enforcement budget today, was already more than sufficient to police all
antitrust-relevant conduct in the U.S. economy.88 That is unlikely.
III. HOW THE RULE OF REASON PRESUMPTION MAY HAVE
INCREASED ERROR COSTS: THE BASIC THEORY AND SOME
IMPLICATIONS
A. THE PERCEIVED UNIFORMITY OF AMBIGUOUS CONDUCT AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES
We have seen that, by requiring that all ambiguous conduct—all
conduct not obviously good for consumers or obviously bad for consumers—be subject to rules of reason, but providing no way for
budget-constrained enforcers to pay for the rules of reason, the Court
in effect established a de facto judicial policy of dividing ambiguous
conduct between rules of reason and per se rules of legality, because
86. For a description of this conduct, see infra Parts IV–V. Cf. ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, JONATHAN B. BAKER & JOSHUA D. WRIGHT, ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE:
CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 1134 (2d ed. 2008) (“If government enforcers devote fewer resources to investigating antitrust violations . . . those
acts will reduce the likelihood that any particular violator will be detected and convicted. Unless the damages multiple [in private enforcement cases] is increased under
such circumstances, the level of deterrence will be reduced.”).
87. In recent years, courts have taken a harder line on the measurement of damages. See GAVIL ET AL., supra note 86, at 1139 (“[R]ecently, plaintiffs have faced increasingly skeptical courts in presenting their cases for damages.”). For the tightening of
scope of liability rules, see William H. Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1445, 1445 (1985).
88. See supra Figure 1.
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enforcers must introduce gaps into enforcement in order to pay for
the rules of reason.89 Dividing ambiguous conduct between rules of
reason and rules of per se legality might not be a great departure from
proper decision-theoretic practice, however, if the Court were to believe that ambiguous conduct can be grouped into categories of conduct that are mostly good for consumers and categories of conduct
that are mostly bad for consumers. In that case, the per se rules of legality might be applied to the mostly good conduct and the rules of
reason to the mostly bad conduct, and the results might reduce error
costs relative to a regime in which the Court were to make all of the
conduct, including the mostly good conduct, per se illegal.
But the Court does not appear to believe that ambiguous conduct
is neatly divisible into portions that are mostly good and portions that
are mostly bad. Instead, the Court appears to view all ambiguous conduct as undifferentiated—as all having the same probability of being
good or of being bad—with a few small exceptions. As a result, it is
possible that each and every de facto per se rule of legality imposed
by the Court through a failure to attend to the enforcement budget
constraint has made consumers worse off under the Court’s own estimation of the character of antitrust-relevant conduct. The Court has
made clear that the Court believes that price fixing is unambiguously
bad, which is why the Court continues to make price-fixing per se illegal.90 But the Court has never suggested that the conduct the Court
considers ambiguous in character, and to which the Court therefore
applies the rule of reason today, can be neatly divided into categories
of conduct that are mostly good and other categories that are mostly
bad. The Court has, for example, never suggested that the Court thinks
predatory pricing to be more or less likely to harm consumers than
resale price maintenance, refusals to deal, vertical nonprice restraints,
or a host of other categories of conduct upon which the Court has imposed the rule of reason.91 Judges appear to believe that all of this conduct has the same risk profile.92 It follows that, if the Court believes
89. See supra Part I; Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 103–04 (1984).
90. See supra Part I; Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 349–51
(1982).
91. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 219–23 (1940) (decrying price fixing under any circumstance); Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226 (1993) (observing that “predatory pricing schemes
are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
For rule of reason treatment of resale price maintenance, refusals to deal, vertical
nonprice restraints, and other categories, see infra Parts IV–V.
92. See Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 1, at 79–80 (“[T]he law acts as if error is apt
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any of this conduct to be mostly bad, then it believes all of this conduct
to be mostly bad, in which case the Court’s inadvertent creation of
rules of per se legality must have allowed mostly bad conduct to go
unpunished and therefore to have increased error costs relative to a
regime in which all conduct were made per se illegal. It also follows
from the fact that the Court does not distinguish between the harmfulness of different categories of ambiguous conduct that the Court
must treat all ambiguous conduct that the Court cannot afford to subject to a rule of reason alike, either making it all per se illegal or all per
se legal. For if the conduct is all thought to be mostly good, then making part of it per se illegal would increase error costs relative to making it all per se legal, and, if the conduct is all thought to be mostly bad,
then making part of it per se legal would increase error costs relative
to making it all per se illegal. This point bears repeating: If the Court
believes ambiguous conduct to be mostly good—in the sense of mostly
beneficial for consumers—then the Court should make per se legal any
conduct that enforcers cannot afford to subject to the rule of reason,
and, if the Court believes ambiguous conduct to be mostly bad—in the
sense of mostly harmful to consumers—then the Court should make per
se illegal any conduct that enforcers cannot afford to subject to the rule
of reason.93 This means that getting the rule wrong—making conduct
per se legal when all conduct should be per se illegal in order to minimize error costs or making conduct per se illegal when conduct should
be per se legal in order to minimize error costs—through a failure deliberately to choose which rule to apply would lead not only to increased error costs but to greatly increased error costs because the
rule would increase error costs for not just some, but all ambiguous
conduct.
I have been careful to write only of the Court’s beliefs regarding
whether conduct is good or bad, rather than the factual question
whether conduct actually is good or bad. The reason the Court’s perception regarding the character of ambiguous conduct matters, rather
than the actual character of the conduct, is that decision theory is the
science of decision-making under limited knowledge.94 Decision theory teaches how to minimize the probability of error given the level of
information currently held by the decisionmaker, which is to say,

to arise to the same extent for all offenses, other than for those condemned as per se
illegal.”).
93. A mathematical description of this rule is given as Proposition 1 in the Appendix.
94. See PETERSON, supra note 42, at 5–6; Beckner & Salop, supra note 44, at 43.
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given the decisionmaker’s perceptions.95 If the Court lacks any information that would allow it to distinguish between the probability that
predatory pricing will harm consumers and the probability that resale
price maintenance will harm consumers, for example, then decision
theory dictates that, given this perception of homogeneity, the Court
must treat these categories of conduct in like manner.96 Of course, the
two kinds of conduct may in fact have very different effects on consumers, but decision theory requires that the Court treat both kinds
of conduct as equally likely to harm until such time as new information
provides the Court with a basis for distinguishing between them.97
Intermediate levels of analysis, sometimes called “structured rule
of reason” analysis, sometimes “quick look” analysis, and sometimes
“ancillary restraints” analysis, which reduce the burden on plaintiff to
prove harm under the rule of reason, but do not go so far as to make
conduct per se illegal, are exceptions to the general rule that the Court
views all ambiguous conduct as uniform in character.98 The Court applies intermediate analysis when the Court believes that the challenged conduct is more likely to be harmful than the sort of conduct
the Court subjects to full-blown rule of reason analysis.99 But the fact
that the Court believes that a small subset of ambiguous conduct is
particularly likely to harm consumers does not imply that the Court
believes that the rest is particularly unlikely to harm consumers and
is therefore best made per se legal through neglect by cash-strapped
enforcers.100 For this reason, there will be no further discussion of
conduct subject to intermediate analysis in this Article. For purposes
of this Article, conduct subject to intermediate analysis can be treated,
95. See PETERSON, supra note 42, at 143–61; Beckner & Salop, supra note 44, at 43.
96. See PETERSON, supra note 42, at 143–61.
97. See id. at 53–55 (discussing the principle of insufficient reason).
98. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 347–51.
99. See California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 757 (1999) (“‘[Q]uick-look’
analysis is appropriate when an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of
economics could conclude that the arrangements in question have an anticompetitive
effect on customers and markets.” (citing Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984))).
100. Indeed, to the extent that the intermediate analysis rule of reason is more expensive to enforce than per se rules, which is quite possible given that it requires an
inquiry into effects, even if not one as extreme or expensive as the inquiry associated
with the full-blown rule of reason, and enforcers consequently fail to intermediate
analysis rules of reason due to budget limitations, intermediate analysis rules of reason very likely increase error costs, for nonenforcement of them renders legal per se
conduct that the Court clearly believes to be harmful to consumers relative to run-ofthe-mill ambiguous conduct, otherwise the Court would not have selected the conduct
for intermediate analysis.

2021]

A MODEST ANTITRUST

2121

along with conduct currently believed by the Court to be unambiguously bad or unambiguously good, and therefore expressly subject to
rules of per se illegality or legality respectively, as fully outside of the
realm of ambiguous conduct.
By leaving it to enforcers to use enforcement reductions that are
tantamount to per se rules of legality to finance rules of reason, the
Court has acted as if the Court believes that ambiguous conduct is
likely to be mostly good, making per se rules of legality the right choice
for conduct that cannot be subjected to the rule of reason. But the
Court has taken this approach without ever considering whether the
Court really believes ambiguous conduct to in fact be mostly good.101
Instead, the Court has taken this step apparently innocent of the enforcement budget constraint and of the fact that by adopting unaffordable rules of reason throughout antitrust the Court has been creating
de facto rules of per se legality throughout antitrust as well. If it turns
out that upon reflection the Court would conclude that ambiguous
conduct is mostly bad, then the Court’s unintentional embrace of per
se rules of legality in recent decades would be inconsistent with its
expectations regarding error costs, and may, indeed, have increased
error costs. In that case, the Court should instead be subjecting all ambiguous conduct that it cannot subject to rules of reason to rules of per
se illegality.
The per se rules of illegality that the Court should, in that case, be
imposing would, however, be quite unlike those called for under current law because they would apply to ambiguous conduct rather than
to conduct believed by the Court to be unambiguously bad.102 There
would be over-enforcement under these per se rules of illegality—if
the Court’s views are right, the conduct would be mostly, but not completely, bad, and so some good conduct would be condemned—but the
resulting error costs would be the lowest possible given that the enforcement budget does not support application of rules of reason to
all ambiguous conduct and so either rules of per se illegality or rules
of per se legality would need to be applied to some of the conduct.103

101. For a discussion of cases in which courts have made these rule changes without considering enforcement budget constraints, see infra Parts IV–V.
102. Cf. Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49–50 (1977); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1979); Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty.
Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343–44 (1982).
103. Cf. Nealis, supra note 18, at 380–82.
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B. WHEN ABOLISHING THE RULE OF REASON WOULD MINIMIZE ERROR
COSTS
So far the argument has been that if the Court were to believe
conduct to be mostly bad, then the Court should make per se illegal
any conduct not subject to a rule of reason. If the Court were to believe
conduct to be not just mostly bad, but very bad (though the Court need
not believe conduct to be completely bad), then it might even be appropriate for the Court to forego the rule of reason entirely, even when
enforcers can afford to apply it to some conduct, and instead to make
all ambiguous conduct per se illegal.104
Despite the overall greater accuracy of the rule of reason at identifying bad conduct, relative to the accuracy of per se rules of illegality,
the rule of reason will still tend to let some bad conduct escape detection, whereas a per se rule of illegality sweeps in all bad conduct, without error or exception, because a per se rule of illegality proscribes all
conduct that falls within its ambit, bad or good.105 Now, if by mostly
bad conduct we mean conduct that does more harm to consumers
than it does good, and by very bad conduct we mean conduct that does
much more harm to consumers than it does good, then the small
amount of bad conduct that the rule of reason lets slip may, if bad
enough, do more harm than the good done by all the good conduct the
rule of reason accurately identifies and correctly avoids condemning.106 But in that case harm to consumers (that is, error costs) would
be reduced by making the conduct per se illegal, for that would eliminate the bad conduct not precluded by the rule of reason at the cost
only of condemning the less beneficial good conduct preserved by the
rule of reason.107
In other words, sometimes a per se rule against all conduct is better for consumers even when rule of reason treatment for at least
some of the conduct is affordable, and even when the conduct is
known to have sufficient consumer-beneficial elements that a per se
rule of illegality under current law, which allows such a rule only when
the conduct always harms consumers, would be inappropriate.108 This
peculiar result depends both on the probability that the conduct will
harm consumers and the extent to which the rule of reason tends

104. Cf. id.
105. See Beckner & Salop, supra note 44, at 64 (stating that the additional information generated by the rule of reason “is unlikely to eliminate all errors”).
106. For a more precise definition of “mostly bad” conduct, see infra Part VII.
107. Cf. id. at 63–64.
108. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 49–50.
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erroneously to fail to preclude bad conduct.109 As the rule of reason
becomes better at precluding bad conduct, however, a per se rule
against all conduct becomes less and less likely to make consumers
better off relative to a rule of reason.
C. THE NECESSITY OF ARBITRARY ACTION
Conduct it perceives to be very bad aside, the Court must use
rules of reason to the extent permitted by the enforcement budget in
order to minimize error costs.110 In this more general context, when
the enforcement budget is insufficient to enable application of rules of
reason to all ambiguous conduct, the choice of which part of the conduct to subject to the rule of reason, and which to bring under per se
rules of illegality or legality, has, surprisingly, no effect on error
costs.111 Because all of the conduct is of the same perceived character,
the conduct can arbitrarily be divided into conduct subject to the appropriate per se rule and conduct subject to the rule of reason, without
regard to traditional categorizations of the conduct as predatory pricing, resale price maintenance, refusal to deal, and so on.112 All that
matters is that no more conduct than enforcers can afford to police (in
the sense of no more conduct than can be accommodated by enforcers
without forcing them to start reducing enforcement in order to balance their budgets) be placed in the rule of reason category. If, for example, the enforcement cost of applying the rule of reason to minimum resale price maintenance were the same as the enforcement cost
109. A mathematical description of this rule is given as Proposition 4 in the Appendix. This rule has already been recognized by a number of scholars. See Yannis Katsoulacos & David Ulph, On Optimal Legal Standards for Competition Policy: A General Welfare-Based Analysis, 57 J. INDUS. ECON. 410, 424–45 (2009); Juwon Kwak, Optimal
Antitrust Enforcement: Information Cost and Deterrent Effect, 41 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 371,
383–84 (2016). But see Jacob Seifert, Optimal Legal Standards for Competition Policy
Revisited, 194 ECON. LETTERS 109359 (2020); Yannis Katsoulacos & David Ulph, Optimal Legal Standards for Competition Policy Further Re-Visited, 196 ECON. LETTERS
109578 (2020).
110. If it is possible to vary the level of accuracy of the rule of reason, by changing
the cost of applying it, and hence the cost of enforcing it, then it might be optimal to
invest some of the budget in greater rule of reason accuracy, rather than in applying
the rule of reason to the greatest possible amount of conduct. For more on this, see
infra Part VIII and Proposition 5 in the Appendix.
111. Cf. Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 1, at 103 (“[T]he likelihood, magnitude, and
presence of error are far from homogeneous across case types and business behaviors.
Different forms of conduct are likely to give rise to distinct risks of error, even if those
risks cannot be precisely quantified. As a result, there is good reason for antitrust law
to develop unique standards or rules for each.”).
112. See id. at 79–80 (“[T]he law acts as if error is apt to arise to the same extent
for all offenses, other than for those condemned as per se illegal.”).
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of applying the rule of reason to one third of all predatory pricing and
minimum resale price maintenance cases combined, then making
predatory pricing per se illegal and subjecting resale price maintenance to the rule of reason would have the same error costs as subjecting both categories of conduct to the rule that every third case of
either kind of conduct should fall under the rule of reason.113
Arbitrary treatment of ambiguous conduct may seem to be the
kind of absurd academic result for which economic analysis of law has
justly gained a bad reputation, but it is in fact directly relevant to one
of the major cases in which the Court converted a rule of per se illegality to a rule of reason.114 In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
the Court converted, to a rule of reason, the rule of per se illegality for
non-price vertical restraints on goods for which the manufacturer relinquishes title; the ground the Court gave was that it was arbitrary to
make restraints on goods for which the manufacturer relinquishes title per se illegal when restraints for which the manufacturer retains
title are subject to the rule of reason.115 The Court said nothing to suggest that the Court thought either kind of conduct to be worse than the
other, however, which means that the Court could have divided the
conduct up between rules of reason and rules of per se illegality however the Court wished—so long as enforcers could afford the rules of
reason—without increasing error costs. The Court’s reluctance arbitrarily to subject one part of the conduct to a per se rule of illegality
and the other to a rule of reason was quite unfounded.116
The Court’s decision to subject both categories of conduct to a
rule of reason might well have pushed enforcers up against their
budget constraint and forced them to respond by imposing a de facto
per se rule on some of the conduct through reduced enforcement.117 If
that is true, then, unless the Court believes that non-price vertical restraints are mostly good for consumers, error costs increased as a result of the Court’s move. If the Court believes that non-price restraints
113. Cf. David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Simple Proposal To Halve Litigation
Costs, 91 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1721 (2005) (arguing that randomly halving the number of
tort cases and doubling damages would not “compromis[e] the functioning of our liability system in a significant way”).
114. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 231–34 (1993).
115. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 45–48, 52–55, 57–59
(1977).
116. See id. at 54 (arguing that there is no evidence that “the competitive impact of
vertical restrictions is significantly affected by the form of the transaction”).
117. See id. at 45–48, 52–55. For the behavior of enforcers under a budget constraint, see supra Part I.
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are instead mostly bad for consumers, it would have been better if the
Court had continued to subject a portion of the conduct to a per se rule
of illegality. Assuming that the Court views all non-price vertical restraints as equivalent in harmfulness, the Court’s arbitrary decision to
make restraints for which the manufacturer relinquishes title per se
illegal could not have been expected to harm consumers so long as enforcers’ budgets were exhausted in the enforcement of rules of reason
in other areas of conduct. The maxim that like conduct should be
treated alike simply cannot be followed under a budget constraint in
conjunction with a perception of the conduct as uniform in harmfulness.118
IV. THE COURT HAS NOT SAID WHETHER IT THINKS AMBIGUOUS
CONDUCT IS MOSTLY GOOD OR MOSTLY BAD
Is it really the case that the Court has expressed no view regarding the harmfulness of ambiguous conduct? In truth, the U.S. Reports
are littered with declarations of the virtue of much conduct in which
antitrust once took an interest.119 “[P]redatory pricing schemes are
rarely tried, and even more rarely successful,” declared the Court, for
example, not long before it limited predatory pricing liability only to
cases in which the plaintiff can show a dangerous probability of recoupment.120 This might suggest that the Court actually believes ambiguous conduct to be mostly good, and, if that is the case, then the
Court’s embrace of rules of reason, and the resulting imposition of de
facto rules of per se legality by budget-constrained enforcers, might
be error-cost minimizing.
The Court’s many declarations of the virtue of once-suspect conduct do not, however, apply to conduct that the Court believes to be
ambiguous in character and so do not undermine the conclusion that
the Court has expressed no view regarding the character of ambiguous
118. See Andrei Marmor, Should Like Cases Be Treated Alike?, 11 LEGAL THEORY 27,
27 (2005); Kenneth I. Winston, On Treating Like Cases Alike, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 2–3
(1974).
119. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889–92,
907–08 (2007) (reviewing evidence that resale price maintenance is good for competition and eliminating the Court’s former per se rule of illegality for the practice); Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004) (“The
mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly
prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system.”);
Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224–27 (1993)
(arguing that below-cost pricing, absent evidence of a dangerous probability of recoupment, is good for consumers).
120. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986).
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conduct. The Court’s declarations of virtue apply instead to conduct
that the Court has made per se legal in recent years, and reflects the
view of the Court that this conduct is not merely ambiguous conduct
that is likely to be good, but conduct the Court considers unambiguously good.121 Of course, just as in the case of conduct that the Court
has continued to subject to per se rules of illegality, the Court is engaging in wishful thinking when the Court pronounces a practice unambiguously good.122 All conduct is ambiguous in character.123 The
passion of the Court for deluding itself primarily into seeing conduct
as unambiguously good rather than unambiguously bad reflects the
success of the Chicago School in calling the antitrust project into question.124
The Court’s passion for deluding itself into seeing conduct as unambiguously good does not, however, suggest that the Court believes
ambiguous conduct to be mostly good. The Court really does believe
that the conduct that it has made per se legal in recent decades is unambiguous in character, rather than ambiguous but mostly good, and
so these new per se rules of legality, like the Court’s declarations of
virtue regarding the conduct to which the new rules apply, tell us
nothing about the Court’s views regarding the harmfulness of ambiguous conduct. When the Court in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. ultimately limited predatory pricing claims to
cases in which the plaintiff can show recoupment, for example, the
Court effectively replaced what once amounted to a per se rule against
below-cost pricing with a per se rule of legality for the entire category
of cases of below-cost pricing without recoupment.125 In making per
se legal conduct that includes no recoupment, the Court excised from
legal scrutiny conduct—below-cost pricing without a dangerous
probability of recouping the resulting losses through future high
prices—that the Court declared to be “rarely successful” at harming
121. See, e.g., Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 35–42 (1984)
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (describing tying as harmful to consumers only in “rare
cases”); Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407 (“The
mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly
prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system.”);
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. at 589 (describing predatory
pricing as “rarely successful”).
122. See supra text accompanying note 35.
123. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SIÈCLE 157–79
(1997).
124. See Priest, supra note 6, at S5–7.
125. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224–
28 (1993).
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consumers.126 That phrase echoes the “almost always” language the
Court uses to describe conduct that the Court subjects to per se rules
today.127 The language suggests that the Court thought the conduct to
be unambiguously good—“rarely successful” at being bad means “almost always” good—and that in turn explains why the Court made the
conduct per se legal. The Court subjected the remaining conduct,
which the Court thought ambiguous in character—namely, below-cost
pricing in the presence of a dangerous probability of recoupment—to
rule of reason scrutiny, without saying anything about whether the
Court thought that conduct to be likely to be mostly good or mostly
bad.128
Declarations of virtue regarding once-suspect conduct are often
found in cases in which the Court used increases in the minimum market share required for liability to effectively make per se legal the conduct of firms with market shares that fall below the minimum.129 In
these cases, the Court also converts a rule of per se illegality for the
challenged conduct to a rule of reason.130 The net effect is to convert
conduct by firms that meet the old lower share requirement but not
the new higher share requirement from per se illegality to per se legality, and to convert conduct by firms that had always met the new
higher share requirement from per se illegality to scrutiny under a
rule of reason. The Court’s declarations of virtue in connection with
these rule changes apply to the conduct that goes from per se illegality
to per se legality, not to the conduct that goes from per se illegality to
scrutiny under a rule of reason.131 That is, the declarations apply only
126. See id.
127. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979).
128. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. at 222–
27 (identifying below-cost pricing and recoupment as “prerequisites” for liability, not
guarantees of liability); GAVIL ET AL., supra note 35, at 596–600 (treating the predatory
pricing test as one of several possible rule-of-reason-style approaches to non-per se
treatment of single-firm exclusionary conduct).
129. See GAVIL ET AL., supra note 35, at 697–99 (discussing increase in de facto
share requirements for scrutiny of horizontal mergers); HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at
538–40, 594–97 (discussing increases in de facto share requirements for tying and exclusive dealing).
130. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 345–46 (1962); United
States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 364–66 (1963); Int’l Salt Co. v. United States,
332 U.S. 392, 395–96 (1947); Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 295,
299, 314 (1949); Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 35–42, 45 (1984)
(O’Connor, J., concurring); GAVIL ET AL., supra note 35, at 679–80 (discussing move in
merger law toward analysis of effects).
131. See Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. at 35–42, 45 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring); United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 984–87 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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to conduct that the Court makes per se legal, and which the Court must
therefore believe to be unambiguously good, not to conduct that the
Court believes to be ambiguous in character and which the Court
therefore subjects to rule of reason treatment.
Perhaps the most important example of this type is the horizontal
merger. In 1962, the Court famously upheld the blocking of a merger
between competitors in the shoe retail market that would have resulted in a combined market share of 5%, and, in a pair of 1966 cases,
the Court blocked a supermarket merger accounting for a 7.5% market share and a beer merger accounting for a 4.5% market share.132
The rationale for these rulings, articulated in Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, was the slippery slope.133 Even if a particular merger did not
appear objectionable, argued the Court, approving one small merger
would force the Court to approve all small mergers, with the result
that there would eventually be no small firms left in the industry and
consumers would be harmed.134 The implication was that the Court
had no choice but effectively to prohibit all horizontal mergers.135
“The Government,” declared Justice Stewart in surveying the cases,
“always wins.”136 The Justice Department’s 1982 merger guidelines
killed this de facto per se rule against horizontal mergers and inaugurated a period of lax merger enforcement, continuing to this day, in
which only mergers to three or fewer firms in the market are challenged by enforcers.137 Moreover, the mere fact of a challenge, rare as
it is today, is no longer the kiss of death observed by Justice Stewart.138
Although the “structural presumption” of the mid-century cases,
which the Court relied upon in treating all horizontal mergers as almost automatically unlawful, is still on the books, the Court now
132. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. at 343–44, 346; United States v.
Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 272, 278 (1966); United States v. Pabst Brewing Co.,
384 U.S. 546, 550, 552–53 (1966).
133. See 370 U.S. at 343–44 (“If a merger achieving 5% control were now approved, we might be required to approve future merger efforts . . . . The oligopoly Congress sought to avoid would then be furthered . . . .”).
134. Id.
135. See DANIEL J. GIFFORD & ROBERT T. KUDRLE, THE ATLANTIC DIVIDE IN ANTITRUST:
AN EXAMINATION OF US AND EU COMPETITION POLICY 6 (2015) (stating that in the 1960s
the Supreme Court “virtually barred all horizontal mergers by companies of any significant size”); HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 668 (observing that under the old approach to merger law, it was thought that “high concentration entailed poor performance” whereas “the new approach tends to view high concentration as merely a
prerequisite for . . . poor performance”).
136. Von’s Grocery, 384 U.S. at 301 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
137. See GAVIL ET AL., supra note 35, at 696–700.
138. See Von’s Grocery, 384 U.S. at 301 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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allows defendants to rebut the presumption with evidence that consumers will benefit from the merger. So mergers today are effectively
subject to a rule of searching review for consumer harm, which is to
say, to a rule of reason.139 The net result of these two changes, the limitation of enforcement to large mergers and the de facto application of
a rule of reason standard to those large mergers, has been to replace
the de facto per se rule of illegality for mergers to small market shares
with a per se rule of legality and to replace the de facto rule of per se
illegality for mergers to large market shares with a rule of reason.140
The terms under which enforcers and the lower courts have undertaken this change, and in which the Court has acquiesced, could not be
clearer.141 Courts and enforcers view low-market-share mergers as
unambiguously good for consumers.142 Whereas courts and enforcers
view high-market-share mergers as ambiguous in harmfulness, and
for this reason courts now subject high-market-share mergers to rule
of reason analysis.143 Courts and enforcers have been entirely silent,
however, about whether they believe high-market-share mergers
likely to be mostly good for consumers or mostly bad for them.
As in the case of mergers, the Court has used increases in market
share thresholds to create rules of per se legality with respect to exclusive dealing. But here the Court has increased the minimum share
of an upstream or downstream market that the defendant must foreclose in order for liability to exist rather than, as the Court has allowed
the lower courts to do in the merger context, increasing the minimum
market share of the defendant required for liability to exist. In the
139. See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 364–65 (1963) (creating
the structural presumption); United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 990–92
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (rebutting structural presumption); United States v. Gen. Dynamics
Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 503–04 (1974) (rebutting structural presumption); Andrew I.
Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The Modern Rule of Reason in
Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 762, 762 n.144 (2012) (suggesting that merger law applies a rule of reason); GAVIL ET AL., supra note 35, at 692–708 (tracking the decline of
the structural presumption); Decision and Order at 168–69, State of New York v.
Deutsche Telekom AG, No. 19-cv-05434 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2020) (declining to block
merger on ground that the merger would benefit consumers). That said, most merger
challenges today are rejected because the merger is thought to have no anticompetitive effects (e.g., because it is too small) rather than because the merger is thought to
benefit consumers notwithstanding anticompetitive effects.
140. See GAVIL ET AL., supra note 35, at 692–708.
141. See id. at 697–700 (observing that although the Court has not decided a merger case since the 1970s, the Court has acquiesced in the major changes in merger law
brought about by enforcers and the lower courts since that time).
142. See id. at 699; U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 5.3
(2010).
143. See GAVIL ET AL., supra note 35, at 699.
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1949 case known as Standard Stations, the Court effectively made illegal per se exclusive dealing contracts that lock up more than 7% of
a market from competing sellers.144 In 1961, the Court in Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co. seemed to go the other way, suggesting
rule of reason treatment for contracts that satisfy this foreclosure requirement.145 But the Court in effect reimposed the per se rule of illegality for such contracts the following year in Federal Trade Commission v. Brown Shoe Co., a case that also drove the foreclosure threshold
to less than 1%, making virtually all exclusive dealing contracts per se
illegal.146 Over subsequent decades, however, the foreclosure threshold inched up and treatment of suspect conduct became increasingly
careful, until Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde in 1984 created the current state of affairs in which exclusive dealing that fails to
foreclose more than 30% of the market is so unlikely to be condemned
by the Court that it is functionally per se legal and exclusive dealing
that forecloses more than 30% of the market is subject to rule of reason treatment on the model of Tampa Electric.147 Justice O’Connor’s
observation in her celebrated Jefferson Parish concurrence that exclusive dealing contracts “of narrow scope pose no threat of adverse economic consequences” and “may be substantially procompetitive” referred to the character of those contracts that foreclose up to 30% of
the market and are effectively per se legal today.148 Of the ambiguous
conduct that forecloses more than that amount, Justice O’Connor expressed no opinion regarding the likelihood of harm.149
A similar transition has taken place for tying, which is the conditioning of the sale of one product on purchase of another product also
offered by the seller.150 The Court made the practice per se illegal in a
1947 case in which the defendant required that buyers of its industrial
salting machines purchase all of the salt to be used with the machines
from the defendant.151 The Court later limited the per se rule of illegality to cases in which the defendant has market power in one of the
144. See Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 295, 299, 314 (1949).
145. See 365 U.S. 320, 327–29 (1961).
146. See id.; FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 320–21 (1966); GAVIL ET AL., supra
note 35, at 974.
147. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 596; Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde,
466 U.S. 2, 44–46 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal
Co., 365 U.S. at 327–29.
148. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. at 45 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
149. See id. at 44–46.
150. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 534.
151. See Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 394, 396 (1947).
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two products, on the theory that the tie cannot force consumers to buy
an unwanted product unless one of the products is to some extent indispensable to consumers.152 Since about 1984, however, this per se
rule of illegality has only really existed on paper.153 In some circuits,
plaintiffs who have established power now still must establish “anticompetitive effects,” just as in rule of reason analysis.154 And even
when courts do not require such a showing, courts permit defendants
to offer a slew of defenses that transform the analysis into an openended inquiry into consumer welfare, including the defense that the
tie was needed to introduce consumers to the tied product, and the
defense that consumers actually prefer the product bundle.155 Justice
O’Connor’s concurrence in Jefferson Parish, which also outlined what
a rule of reason style approach to tying might resemble, has, in effect,
if not as a matter of explicit judicial command, become the actual test
for tying.156 The net result is that the original per se rule of illegality
for tying has become a per se rule of legality for tying cases that fail to
meet the loose market power requirement and, since about 1984, a
rule of reason for all other tying cases. Justice O’Connor’s observation
that “[t]ying may be economically harmful primarily in the rare cases
where power in the market for the tying product is used to create additional market power in the market for the tied product” spoke to her
view that tying without market power almost never results in consumer harm, not to any view that when there is market power, and the
character of the conduct is therefore ambiguous, tying is mostly bad
for consumers.157
Each of these examples has involved dividing conduct once subject to a rule of per se illegality into a part that is subject to a rule of
per se legality and a second part that is subject to a rule of reason (although it should be noted that for tying the imposition of the per se
rule of legality on the first part took place long before the moment
during the error cost revolution when the Court converted the second
part to a rule of reason). The Court’s treatment of vertical mergers has
been less complicated. The Court has simply flipped from a per se rule

152. See Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 505 (1969).
153. See Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. at 34–35 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring); HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 550.
154. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 535.
155. See id. at 580–81.
156. See Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. at 32–35 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring); HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 584.
157. See Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. at 36–37 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
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of illegality for vertical mergers to a de facto per se rule of legality.158
Up until the mid-1970s, the Court prohibited all vertical mergers that
foreclose more than 15% of the market, and probably prohibited mergers that foreclose as little as 1%.159 A rule of reason applied to the
few vertical mergers that did not satisfy this very low threshold.160 But
by the mid-1980s, lower courts were rejecting cases involving any
amount of foreclosure, with one declaring that vertical mergers are no
longer even a “suspect category.”161 Vertical mergers had, in the eyes
of the courts, become unambiguously good, and the Court acquiesced
in this change.162
V. APPLICATION TO RECENT RULE CHANGES
In many of the areas of antitrust law described in Part IV, the
Court (or the lower courts in merger cases) started with conduct subject to a rule of per se illegality and divided the conduct in two, making
one portion per se legal and subjecting the other to the rule of reason,
using a market share screen applied to the defendant to draw the line.
Assuming that enforcers did not have any slack in their budgets when
these changes were put into law—and in Part III argued that they did
not—enforcers would only have been able to enforce the new rules of
reason if the Court had changed the rules to be applied to some other
category of antitrust-relevant conduct in a way that reduced enforcement costs or if enforcers had reduced the vigor with which they enforced the antitrust laws. This Article argues that enforcers balanced
their budgets by reducing the vigor with which they enforced the antitrust laws, and indeed that enforcers continue to balance their budgets by enforcing the antitrust laws with less vigor than they would
have had the antitrust laws remained primarily a collection of per se
rules rather than rules of reason. But this argument follows only if all
158. See GAVIL ET AL., supra note 35, at 880–82; HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 522,
532; Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 334 (1962); Reazin v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 1360, 1489 (D. Kan. 1987).
159. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. at 369, 373 (condemning a vertical merger that foreclosed 1% of the market); Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405
U.S. 562, 568, 575 (1972); Ash Grove Cement Co. v. FTC, 577 F.2d 1368, 1371–72, 1380
(9th Cir. 1978); GAVIL ET AL., supra note 35, at 876–77.
160. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 528 (noting the requirement of proof of anticompetitive effect).
161. See id. at 529; Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 663 F. Supp. at
1489.
162. See GAVIL ET AL., supra note 35, at 880. The lower courts recently affirmed their
hostility to vertical merger cases in rejecting the government’s case against the
AT&T/TimeWarner merger. See United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir.
2019); United States v. AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161 (D.D.C. 2018).
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the new rules of per se legality also created by the Court at the same
time that the Court adopted all the new rules of reason did not already
balance enforcement budgets.
The new per se rules of legality created by the Court cannot be
expected to have paid for the rules of reason, however, because most
of those per se rules of legality replaced per se rules of illegality, which
are cheap to enforce relative to rules of reason, so the savings generated by the rules of per se legality were likely lower than the enforcement cost increases created by the new rules of reason and therefore
are unlikely to have fully offset the cost increases.163 Indeed, unless
the enforcement cost of per se rules of illegality is closer to the enforcement cost of rules of reason than it is to the enforcement cost of
per se rules of legality, which seems unlikely in light of anecdotal evidence regarding the enforcement cost of rules of reason, the savings
from the conversion of per se rules of illegality to per se rules of legality with respect to a given amount of conduct cannot equal the enforcement cost created by the conversion of rules of per se illegality to
rules of reason for an equal amount of conduct.164 If—to choose a few
figures at random—the rule of reason costs $11 to enforce with respect to a particular amount of conduct, and the rule of per se legality
costs $1 to enforce with respect to that amount of conduct, then converting a rule of per se illegality to a rule of per se legality with respect
to a given amount of conduct will create enough enforcement cost savings to offset the cost of converting a rule of per se illegality to a rule
of reason for an equal amount of conduct only if the rule of per se illegality costs $6 or more to enforce. It is likely, however, that a rule of
per se illegality would cost $3 or $4—an amount much closer to the
$1 cost of enforcing a per se rule of legality, because neither rule requires a costly inquiry into consumer harm.
One caveat is that if the amount of conduct converted from per se
illegality to per se legality is larger than the amount of conduct converted from per se illegality to rules of reason, then the savings from
the former change could offset the enforcement cost of the latter because enforcement costs increase per unit of conduct to which a rule
is applied. If enforcers save $2 or $3 per unit of conduct on the conversion from per se illegality to per se legality, but incur a cost increase of $5 per unit of conduct on the conversion from per se illegality to rules of reason, then, although, unit for unit, costs rise as a result
163. See Stucke, supra note 6, at 1460–65.
164. See id.; Nealis, supra note 18, at 367–70; Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason, 70 FLA. L. REV. 81, 98–136 (2018) (addressing the costs associated with the burden
of proof and evidentiary requirements of the rule of reason).
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of these rule changes, if the conversion from per se illegality to per se
legality affects three units of conduct and the conversion from per se
illegality to rules of reason affects only one unit of conduct, then the
savings will be $6 to $9, which does offset the $5 increase in costs for
the one unit of conduct affected by the conversion of rules of per se
illegality to rules of reason.
The conduct the Court converted from per se illegality to per se
legality was, however, often lesser in amount than the conduct the
Court converted from per se illegality to the rule of reason, and in any
case unlikely to be so much larger in amount as to compensate for the
vastly greater enforcement cost of rule of reason cases. Market share
thresholds in merger and exclusive dealing cases remain at about
30%, meaning that 70% of conduct was likely converted from per se
illegality to rule of reason treatment.165 Even if conduct is not uniformly distributed in the market or foreclosure shares of the firms engaging in the conduct, mergers and exclusive dealing would need to be
badly skewed in incidence towards small-share contexts for the top
70% of conduct by share to be smaller in amount than the bottom
30%, and would need to be smaller still to offset high rule of reason
enforcement costs.
Predatory pricing and vertical mergers are the only exception.
The courts now treat vertical mergers as per se legal (a few exceptional cases aside), so no enforcement cost increases associated with
the embrace of rules of reason happened in the vertical merger area,
and so enforcers have saved money from this change.166 It is also likely
that there are very few predatory pricing cases involving recoupment,
and so the cost of the embrace of a rule of reason for recoupment cases
was likely small relative to the savings from making below-cost pricing without recoupment legal per se. The savings enjoyed by enforcers
in those areas certainly help enforcers cover the costs of rules of reason but are unlikely fully to offset them given the great expense of
rules of reason.
The unlikelihood that the new per se rules of legality offset the
cost of the new rules of reason is reinforced by the fact that the Court
also replaced several per se rules of illegality over this period with
rules of reason, without creating any potentially compensating rules
of per se legality at the same time, likely more than offsetting any savings from converting rules of per se illegality to rule of per se legality
165. See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 364–65; Jefferson Par. Hosp.
Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 44–46 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
166. See GAVIL ET AL., supra note 35, at 880–82; HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 527–
30.
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in the areas of predatory pricing and vertical mergers. Tying, discussed in Part IV, is one example: courts effectively converted tying in
the presence of market power from per se illegality to rule of reason
treatment in the early 1980s. Intrabrand vertical restraints are another. These are restrictions imposed by manufacturers on the behavior of retailers with respect to the sale of the manufacturer’s goods.167
In the late 1960s, all such restraints, whether they involved imposition
of a minimum or maximum price at which the retailer could sell the
good or restricted the manner of sale, were per se unlawful.168 By
2007, however, the Court had subjected all intrabrand restraints to
the rule of reason, the Court’s opinion in Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc. putting the final nail in the coffin of per se treatment
for intrabrand restraints by overturning the 97-year-old rule against
resale price maintenance.169 The Court did not make any intrabrand
vertical restraints per se legal. Needless to say, in the cases that converted the per se rule against intrabrand vertical restraints to a rule
of reason, the Court made no effort to ensure that prevailing enforcement budgets could handle the added enforcement cost.170
By converting the rule of per se illegality for intrabrand vertical
restraints to a rule of reason, the Court signaled that it considers intrabrand vertical restraints to be ambiguous conduct. It is worth noting, in connection with the argument of Part IV, that the Court said
nothing in Leegin, however, to suggest whether the Court believes intrabrand vertical restraints to be mostly good or mostly bad.171 What
the Court emphasized instead was the conduct’s ambiguity: “Though
each side of the debate can find sources to support its position, it suffices to say here that economics literature is replete with procompetitive justifications for a manufacturer’s use of resale price maintenance.”172 The Court’s emphasis on procompetitive justifications here
does not express a belief that resale price maintenance is mostly good,

167. See GAVIL ET AL., supra note 35, at 898; HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 602.
168. See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 407–09 (1911);
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967); Albrecht v. Herald
Co., 390 U.S. 145, 147, 154 (1968). For the discussion of arbitrary conduct, see supra
Part III.B.3.
169. 551 U.S. 877, 889–92, 907–08 (2007); Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park &
Sons Co., 220 U.S. at 407–09; Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977);
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997).
170. For the reaction of enforcers to the budget constraint, see supra Part I.
171. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. at 889–99; Cont’l
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 51–59; State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. at 14–21.
172. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. at 889.
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but rather the Court’s rejection of the Court’s former position that resale price maintenance is exclusively anticompetitive.
The Court also replaced per se rules of illegality (here de facto
rather than formal) with rules of reason in the area of refusals to
deal.173 The claim that a firm has acted to exclude a competitor from
the market in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act by denying the
competitor access to an essential input has always been accorded rule
of reason treatment in name.174 But in the 1960s and 1970s the lower
courts developed a general test for such claims, known as the essential
facilities doctrine, that has little rule of reason flavor.175 The doctrine
provided for liability under section 2’s prohibition on monopolization
if the following four bright-line requirements were met: (1) the defendant controls an essential facility; (2) competitors cannot reasonably duplicate the facility; (3) the defendant denies access to a competitor; and (4) the defendant could feasibly provide access.176 The
extraordinary thing about this test is that it did not require a showing
of anticompetitive effect, much less consumer harm, as required under rule of reason review.177 The essential facilities doctrine was in
fact a per se rule against all conduct falling within the ambit of its four
requirements.
In 2007, however, the Court in Verizon Communications Inc. v.
Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko expressed deep skepticism about the essential facilities doctrine, and no court has since applied the doctrine
to decide a case.178 Instead, the courts now handle refusal to deal cases
using full-blown rule of reason analysis.179 The only semblance of a
formal rule that is left in refusal to deal doctrine today is the requirement that the refusal constitute termination of a prior profitable
course of dealing, a requirement that has never squarely been endorsed by the Court and remains controversial.180 Thus what was
173. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 387–416.
174. See 15 U.S.C. § 2; HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 387–416.
175. See Robert Pitofsky, Donna Patterson & Jonathan Hooks, The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under U.S. Antitrust Law, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 443, 445–49 (2002); MCI
Commc’ns v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132–33 (7th Cir. 1983).
176. See Pitofsky et al., supra note 175, at 445–49; MCI Commc’ns v. Am. Tel. & Tel.
Co., 708 F.2d at 1132–33.
177. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Muris,
supra note 7, at 861; HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 341.
178. 540 U.S. 398, 410–11 (2004).
179. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 58.
180. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409–10;
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 58 (applying rule of reason analysis); Howard A. Shelanski, Unilateral Refusals To Deal in Intellectual and Other Property, 76
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once a per se rule against refusals to deal in essential inputs has today
become a costly rule of reason.
In connection with the argument of Part IV, it is worth noting here
as well that the Court’s comments in Trinko about the character of refusals to deal showed that the Court views monopolizing conduct as
ambiguous, and did not suggest that the Court believes the conduct to
be more or less harmful to consumers than any other kind of ambiguous conduct.181 The Court observed that “we have been very cautious
in recognizing” refusals to deal as antitrust violations “because of the
uncertain virtue of forced sharing and the difficulty of identifying . . .
anticompetitive conduct by a single firm.”182 It was the remedy, and
the ambiguity of the conduct, that the Court emphasized, not a belief
that the conduct is mostly good for consumers.183
The Court’s conversion of per se rules of legality in the areas of
tying, intrabrand vertical restraints, and monopolization—all of
which comprise conduct that is of great value to consumers—to rules
of reason likely more than offset any enforcement cost savings associated with the Court’s adoption of rules of per se legality for predatory
pricing and vertical mergers.
VI. ANTITRUST’S RULES VS. STANDARDS EXCEPTIONALISM
In the rule-change cases discussed in Part IV and Part V, the Court
rejected rules of per se illegality for conduct that the Court had come
to view as ambiguous in harmfulness to consumers, preferring instead
to apply rules of reason. The Court’s rejection of per se rules of illegality for ambiguous conduct in antitrust contrasts greatly with the approach of courts to ambiguity in all other areas of the law.
First-year law students inevitably encounter, perhaps in a course
on contract law, a lesson on the importance of rules over standards.184
The substance of this lesson is that the sympathetic defendant, no matter how destitute, must still be made to pay up under the terms of the
contract, even to a wealthy defendant who does not really need the
money, even if the defendant’s children may starve, and even if according to every social or moral metric the contract should not be performed because the cost of filtering every individual contract case for
ANTITRUST L.J. 369, 372–73 (2009); Frank X. Schoen, Note, Exclusionary Conduct After
Trinko, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1625, 1631 (2005).
181. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the
Forms: A Reassessment of § 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217, 1227–28 (1982).
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unfair consequences is simply too high.185 If asked in every case to
prove that enforcement of contract terms is good for society, the lesson continues, plaintiffs would find it cost effective only to bring many
fewer cases and might desist even from bringing cases in which the
enforcement of harsh terms would actually be fair.186 To make the enforcement of contracts practicable, students learn, the law of contracts
must be a law of bright-line rules, not of standards.187 Breach must
always give rise to a remedy, and justice cannot be meted out on a
case-by-case basis, however regrettable that may be for widows and
orphans, and however desirable case-by-case adjudication of social
consequences might be in a world of unlimited resources.188 It is in the
nature of law—indeed, law’s defining feature—to outrage morality in
the interests of expediency, to sacrifice some innocents on the altar of
pursuit of the great mass of the guilty.189 Absent that cold stare, the
lesson concludes, the law becomes no different from justice.
Treating all deviations from the letter of contract terms as breach
is tantamount to imposing a per se rule of illegality on conduct that is
ambiguous in terms of the harm it inflicts on society because some
breaches of contract are probably good for the public while others of
course are not.190 But to impose per se rules of illegality on ambiguous
conduct is just what antitrust used to do before the Court embraced
the rule of reason presumption.191 The Court’s old view that per se
rules are necessary given enforcement budget constraints is the normal way of things everywhere else in the law: most other areas of law
are in fact just collections of per se rules applied to ambiguous conduct.192 In the criminal law, the killer with intent goes to prison even
185. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1692, 1708 (1976); Baird & Weisberg, supra note 184, at 1229–30.
186. Kennedy, supra note 185, at 1692, 1708; Baird & Weisberg, supra note 184, at
1229–30.
187. See Baird & Weisberg, supra note 184, at 1231 (“Although formal rules may
ignore the bargain-in-fact in particular cases, adherence to such rules furthers the goal
of promoting mutually beneficial transactions . . . .”).
188. See id. at 1229–31.
189. See James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 110 (1908) (“The
law is utilitarian. It exists for the realization of the reasonable needs of the community.
If the interest of an individual runs counter to this chief object of the law, it must be
sacrificed. That is why . . . the innocent suffer and the wicked go unpunished.”).
190. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the Theory of
Efficient Breach, and the Indifference Principle in Contract Law, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 975,
997–1013 (2005) (discussing the theory of efficient breach in contract law).
191. See supra Part I.
192. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1958); United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221–22 (1940).
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if the loosening of the homicide victim’s mortal coil has made the
world a better place.193 The violator of the duty of care in tort and the
trespasser in property both pay because they have crossed bright
lines, regardless whether their behavior created a net gain for society
or not.194 So, too, in the intellectual property arena, the unauthorized
copier of textbooks pays, or even serves time in prison, regardless
whether the copies helped the disadvantaged to learn or not.195 Only
in antitrust today does one find what Max Weber denigrated as premodern “kadi justice:” a free-wheeling and case-specific inquiry into
the harmfulness to society of the challenged conduct (with society
proxied in antitrust by harm to consumers).196
It is hard not to see in this antitrust exceptionalism the hand of
wealthy defendants, who have pushed, through a Chicago School
movement lavishly funded by defendant money, to buy for themselves
that rarest of things in the law: a law of justice, rather than a law of
rules; a law oriented to getting every case right at all costs, not most
cases right under budget.197 That is, money seems to have bought antitrust defendants something enjoyed not even by that most needy of
defendants, the capital defendant, who dies for violating per se rules
against killing with malice aforethought regardless of the overall social value of his deed.198

193. See SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 387–89 (7th ed. 2001) (describing the intent requirement
for murder); Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 456–58 (1982) (“[O]ne must remember that
the basis for adjudging harm is not supposed to be Victim’s character or personality.”).
194. See, e.g., Charles O. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA.
L. REV. 359, 361 (1951) (“[W]here X deliberately trespasses on the land of another, he
is held liable for any harm incidental to such trespass, no matter how unforeseeable it
was or how little he had any intention of causing damage at all.”); Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40–41 (1915).
195. See, e.g., Cambridge Univ. Press v. Albert, 906 F.3d 1290, 1302 (11th Cir. 2018)
(siding with publishers in an action for copyright infringement against a university
serving disadvantaged students that had allowed faculty to share copies of expensive
textbooks with their students); 1 MARK D. JANIS, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & MARK A. LEMLEY,
IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 751 (1st ed. 2002) (discussing criminal penalties for copyright infringement); 17 U.S.C. § 506; 18 U.S.C. § 2319.
196. See 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY
758–60 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1968).
197. See Elliott Ash, Daniel L. Chen & Suresh Naidu, Ideas Have Consequences: The
Effect of Law and Economics on American Justice 2–6 (March 20, 2019) (unpublished
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2992782 [https://perma.cc/FEX7-V2WL].
198. See KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 193, at 387–89, 483–84.
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But the money story is perhaps not so clear cut as appears at first
glance. For the orientation of antitrust toward doing justice in the individual case has, if anything, roots in the progressive movement,
which can hardly be described as prioritizing the interests of large antitrust defendants.199 It was Justice Brandeis, for example, author of
“The Curse of Bigness,” who wrote the majority opinion in Board of
Trade of Chicago v. United States, the 1918 case that first gave flesh to
the rule of reason.200
To understand antitrust’s rules-vs.-standards exceptionalism, it
is necessary to understand antitrust’s intellectual origins. Progressives of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries revolted
against a legal landscape that, in their view, was asphyxiating government policymaking with inflexible rules left over from earlier ages
that had faced very different problems from those faced by the modern world.201 Some progressives tried to respond to the straightjacket
of old laws by encouraging judges to reinterpret rules to achieve better policy outcomes.202 Imposing this “legal realist” approach on
judges deciding cases in established areas of the law turned out to be
difficult, however, because reinterpreting rules in light of policy goals
smacks of lawlessness and political agency.203 A realist judge must ignore the plain meaning of legacy legal doctrine in favor of the judge’s
own outcome-oriented reinterpretations. Although the realist judge is
supposed to choose those reinterpretations with the good of society
in mind, the reinterpretations could look to others, and even to the
realist judge himself, uncomfortably like instantiations of the judge’s
own personal political preferences.204
In creating the antitrust laws in 1890, progressives sought to
overcome the natural judicial reluctance to reinterpret rules by building reinterpretation into the antitrust system and, they hoped,

199. See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); RICHARD
HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 215–271 (1961).
200. See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT
(1914); Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. at 235–41; GAVIL ET AL., supra note
35, at 104.
201. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960, at
169–70, 189–92 (1992).
202. See id. at 187–92.
203. See id. at 191 (noting Justice Cardozo’s concerns about the “danger of discretion”); KENNEDY, supra note 123, at 180 (arguing that judges deny that they are influenced by ideology in order to avoid “confront[ing] the contradictory character of the
role constraints under which [they] operate”).
204. See KENNEDY, supra note 123, at 180.
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thereby ensuring that the law would evolve as society changed.205 To
prevent judges from feeling embarrassed to reinterpret an old rule of
antitrust law, progressives made the texts of the antitrust laws brief,
cryptic, and indeed constitutional in character.206 The law prohibited
agreements “in restraint of trade” and conduct that tends to “monopolize”; and that was it.207 More importantly, progressives injected the
legal realist spirit into antitrust adjudication from the very beginning,
ensuring that courts explicitly accepted that the interpretation of the
antitrust laws would be a common-law-like process according to
which the courts would periodically reinterpret the rules to better
conform them to a changing economy.208 Antitrust is, as a result, probably the greatest triumph of legal realism.
Antitrust reflects not only the progressives’ legal realism, however, but also their wariness of law itself.209 Frustrated with the unwillingness or inability of the courts to make good policy on their own,
whether due to the courts’ fear of reinterpretation or for some other
reason, progressives went beyond advocating law reform through legal realism to call for the wholesale replacement of courts with administrative agencies staffed with people who would be willing to make
policy rather than just to apply the law: with social scientists rather
than lawyers.210 Thus when courts applying the antitrust laws failed,
in the law’s first two decades, to bring down the large firms that progressives intended to be antitrust’s targets, progressives created the
Federal Trade Commission in 1914 as America’s first independent administrative agency, staffed it with economists, and even gave the
agency its own courts—“Article II” courts based in the executive
branch rather than “Article III” courts belonging to the judicial
branch—dedicated to the adjudication of antitrust cases.211 The goal
205. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 75 (“[T]he Sherman Act can be regarded as
‘enabling’ legislation—an invitation to the federal courts to learn how businesses and
markets work and formulate a set of rules that will make them work in socially efficient
ways. The standards to be applied always have and probably always will shift as ideology, technology and the American economy changes.”).
206. See Baxter, supra note 66, at 662–66.
207. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2.
208. See Baxter, supra note 66, at 662–66; Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States,
221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1958).
209. See, e.g., BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT
HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 162 (1998) (noting Robert Hale’s
“intellectual distaste for the inept flounderings of the courts”).
210. See HORWITZ, supra note 201, at 214–16; FRIED, supra note 209, at 162–63.
211. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 80; Herbert Hovenkamp, The Federal Trade
Commission and the Sherman Act, 62 FLA. L. REV. 871, 871–72 (2010); U.S. CONST. arts.
II–III.
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was to extract antitrust policy from the judiciary entirely and to put it
into the hands of specialist policymakers.212 Neither the administrative nor the legal realist tendencies of progressivism ultimately won
out in antitrust, and so antitrust to this day has two principal enforcers, the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division, which enforces the
antitrust laws through the courts and invites the courts to update and
adapt antitrust doctrine in light of the evolving needs of a modern
economy, and the FTC, which enforcers the antitrust laws through its
own internal judicial processes as well as through the courts.213
The rule of reason is the product both of progressives’ legal realism and their distrust of the law. Justice Brandeis sought in Chicago
Board of Trade to advance the progressives’ realist project by emphasizing the power of courts applying the antitrust laws to decide antitrust cases on policy grounds, through a consideration of the consequences of laws, not just of the letter of the law.214 In his opinion in
Chicago Board of Trade, Justice Brandeis wished to argue that the effects of rules matter in antitrust. Accordingly, he declared that “[t]he
true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is
such as may suppress or even destroy competition.”215 Effects, not legal language, should determine legality. But then Justice Brandeis
went further, and sowed the seed of antitrust’s present predicament.216
In the struggle to continuously reinvent the law through judicial
reinterpretation, there is a temptation to stress the importance of the
facts of the individual case. The per se rule laid down by Henry IV
212. See HORWITZ, supra note 201, at 213–16; FRIED, supra note 209, at 162–63.
213. See HORWITZ, supra note 201, at 215; Darren Bush, Out of the DOJ Ashes Rises
the FTC Phoenix: How to Enhance Antitrust Enforcement by Eliminating an Antitrust Enforcement Agency, 53 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 33, 35–38 (2016). The administrative tendency in antitrust has been decidedly less successful than the realist tendency, for the
FTC’s administrative enforcement powers remain subject to judicial review that has in
recent years been quite harsh. See Kovacic, supra note 20, at 240–41. The heavy hand
taken by the courts with the FTC contrasts with the extraordinary deference they accord the decisions of the Federal Reserve Board, which can raise rates and throw millions out of work without fear of judicial review. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Separation of
Powers and the Limits of Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 365, 370 n.34 (1989).
That heavy hand also contrasts with the culture in Europe of judicial deference to the
E.U.’s competition authority. See Angela Huyue Zhang, Jingchen Liu & Nuno Garoupa,
Judging in Europe: Do Legal Traditions Matter?, 14 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 144, 144–
47 (2018).
214. See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
215. Id.
216. See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS (Osmond K. Fraenkel ed., 1934).
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looks no less legitimate than when the rule is shown to harm a particular widow or orphan today under the particular facts of a particular
case.217 But that stressing of facts in particular cases, to the end of reinventing the law, is not the same thing as a call to do away with per
se rules. Rather, when the goal is to update the law, the facts inform
the crafting of a new per se rule, one that does more justice, but which
is still a rigid rule, and will continue to do some injustice in some cases.
Justice Brandeis started with a compelling set of facts in Chicago Board
of Trade—antitrust’s rule against price fixing threatened in that case
to undermine an agreement between commodities traders that helped
make prices transparent and thereby protected unsophisticated traders from sharp dealing—but rather than fashion an updated per se
rule against price fixing that would exempt agreements that encourage price transparency from condemnation, Justice Brandeis unfortunately resolved the case by doing away with per se rules entirely, declaring, as a general matter, that to determine whether a challenged
practice is harmful, “the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint
and its effect, actual or probable.”218 He thereby slipped from seeking
out rhetorical advantage in the process of revising per se rules
through an appeal to the justice of the individual case before him to
taking the position that there should be no per se rules and the law
should instead always seek to do justice in the individual case.
To see that this was a mistake, even for a progressive, it is necessary only to realize that governance, whether through the law or
through policymaking and politics, is never case-based, but is instead
always a process of choosing per se rules. Deconcentrating American
industry, raising the minimum wage, or cutting interest rates: these
are policy proposals that all amount to per se rules that would certainly cause harm to sympathetic victims in some individual cases in
addition to doing good in many other cases.219 Precisely because policymaking is outcome oriented, practical, and aware of the real world,
policymakers recognize that resource constraints often preclude the

217. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 991, 1001
(1997).
218. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. at 238.
219. Indeed, a major debate within the field of macroeconomics regarding the exercise of the Federal Reserve Board’s discretionary authority under the law to set monetary policy is whether to set that policy on an ad hoc basis or on the basis of voluntarily declared rules. See, e.g., John B. Taylor, Monetary Policy Rules Work and Discretion
Doesn’t: A Tale of Two Eras, 44 J. MONEY CREDIT & BANKING 1017 (2012).
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doing of justice in each individual case.220 It was Justice Brandeis’s unfortunate attempt in Chicago Board of Trade to demonstrate realism’s
results orientation by resolving a particular case on its facts, rather
than by articulating a new results-oriented per se rule, that opened
the door to the case-based unrealism of antitrust today.
VII. MORE ON THE THEORY, ITS ASSUMPTIONS, AND
IMPLICATIONS
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF ASSUMING AN UNBIASED AND REASONABLY
ACCURATE RULE OF REASON
So far the argument in this Article has been that the Court’s failure to take the enforcement budget constraint into account in crafting
the rule of reason presumption has necessarily caused enforcers to try
to use nonenforcement—the de facto application of rules of per se legality to antitrust-relevant conduct—to pay for all the new rules of
reason created by the presumption.221 Further, the argument has been
that this presents a problem for the Court because the Court has expressed no opinion regarding the nature of antitrust-relevant conduct
apart from the conduct that the Court already explicitly subjects to per
se rules. It is therefore possible that the conduct that the Court has
inadvertently subjected to per se legality is actually conduct that the
Court believes to be mostly harmful, in which case making the conduct
per se legal, rather than per se illegal—the other way to save money
on enforcement—has actually increased error costs in antitrust adjudication.222
The argument rests on the rather intuitive claim that making conduct that is mostly bad per se legal will increase error costs. This assumption cannot, however, safely be made without appeal to some additional assumptions about how the rule of reason operates. Certainly,
converting per se rules of illegality to per se rules of legality must increase error costs if the underlying conduct is mostly bad: it is better
for consumers not to be subject to mostly bad conduct than to be subject to it. But what if enforcers balance their budgets by reducing enforcement of rules of reason, rather than rules of per se illegality? If
rules of reason are highly accurate at sorting bad from good conduct,
220. See Ramsi A. Woodcock, Response, Legal Realism: Unfinished Business, 107 KY.
L.J. ONLINE 1, 4–7 (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.kentuckylawjournal.org/online
-originals/index.php/2019/02/14/legal-realism-unfinished-business [https://perma
.cc/95RM-W2LY].
221. These rule changes are discussed supra Parts IV–V.
222. See supra Parts IV–V.
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in the sense that they allow only a small amount of bad conduct to escape condemnation and only mistakenly condemn a small amount of
good conduct, then it follows immediately that converting a rule of
reason to a rule of per se illegality increases error costs, so long as the
underlying conduct is mostly bad. Such a highly accurate rule of reason necessarily does a much better job of catching bad conduct than
does a rule that does not prohibit bad conduct at all. And, on the other
side of the ledger, the per se rule of legality imposed by enforcers eliminates very little error associated with mistaken condemnation of
good conduct because the rule of reason makes very few such errors
to begin with. So the conversion of rules of reason to per se rules of
legality allows a lot more bad conduct to go free than it saves good
conduct from erroneous condemnation. If conduct is mostly bad, then
error costs must rise.
But what if the rule of reason were only accurate in the sense that
it did a good job of identifying good conduct, and therefore of avoiding
mistakenly condemning it, but the rule of reason were to do a very bad
job of identifying bad conduct, allowing a lot of bad conduct to go unpunished? In this case, the extra error costs associated with converting the rule to a rule of per se legality and hence moving to condemn
no bad conduct would be very small—even if the conduct were mostly
bad. For the margin between allowing a lot of bad conduct to go unpunished and allowing all bad conduct to go unpunished is small. It is
therefore possible that the benefits associated with eliminating erroneous condemnation of good conduct—benefits that necessarily result from converting a rule of reason to a rule of per se legality when
the rule of reason erroneously condemns at least a small amount of
good conduct—might outweigh that small margin.
Consider the following example illustrating the contrast between
the error cost effects of converting rules of reason that are equally
good at identifying both good and bad conduct to rules of per se legality and the error costs of converting rules of reason that are better at
identifying one type of conduct than the other to per se rules of legality. Suppose, first, that the rule of reason is equally accurate at identifying both types of conduct: it fails to identify only 20% of bad conduct
and fails to identify only 20% of good conduct. Converting this rule of
reason to a per se rule of legality would cause an additional 80% of
bad conduct not to be identified and an additional 20% of good conduct to be identified because a per se rule of legality allows all bad
conduct to go free but also condemns no good conduct. Whether the
reduction in accuracy of 80% with respect to bad conduct combined
with the increase in accuracy of 20% with respect to good conduct
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ultimately harms consumers (i.e., increases error costs) depends on
the character of the underlying conduct. If the conduct is mostly bad—
let us say that it contains 10 units of bad conduct and 5 units of good
conduct—then 8 additional units of bad conduct will go uncondemned, whereas only one additional unit of good conduct will be
spared erroneous condemnation. And so, if units of conduct are chosen to be of equal value to consumers (an important assumption in its
own right that applies throughout this Article), consumers will be
much worse off—that is, error costs will rise. Rules of reason are assumed to be of this kind in this Article.
But now consider a rule of reason that is more accurate at identifying one kind of conduct than the other: let us say that the rule fails
to identify 90% of bad conduct and 40% of good conduct. In this case,
moving to a per se rule of legality reduces error costs. Now only 10%
more bad conduct—one unit total—escapes condemnation but 40%
more good conduct—two units total—escape erroneous condemnation. In general, if the rule of reason is unbiased in the sense that it is
equally good at identifying good and bad conduct, and if the rule of
reason identifies more than 50% of each, then converting a rule of reason to a per se rule will increase error costs when conduct is mostly
bad. Whether the rule of reason is in fact biased is a matter of some
debate.223 This Article’s adherence to the somewhat idealized picture
of the rule of reason as having low rates of error in identifying both
good and bad conduct, and as having equal rates of error across good
and bad conduct, makes it possible for this Article to argue that even
were any problems with accuracy or bias in the rule of reason to be
resolved, inattention to the enforcement budget constraint would
mean that the conversion of rules of per se illegality to rules of reason
would still have increased error costs.224
223. See infra Part VIII.
224. See infra Part VIII. The assumption that the rule of reason is unbiased and accurate also serves as the basis for the assumption made throughout this Article that
converting rules of per se illegality to rules of reason reduces error costs. That assumption has, in turn, been used to explain why the Court has turned to rules of reason to
address error cost concerns. See supra Introduction. If the rule of reason were to fail to
identify bad conduct 40% of the time and to fail to identify good conduct 80% of the
time—making it a biased rule—then converting a rule of per se illegality to a rule of
reason would increase the amount of bad conduct that enforcers fail to identify by only
40 percentage points, since rules of per se illegality allow 0% of bad conduct to go free,
whereas converting a rule of per se illegality to a rule of reason would reduce the
amount of conduct erroneously condemned by 20 percentage points, since rules of per
se illegality erroneously condemn 100% of good conduct. Assuming, as before, that
there are 10 units of bad conduct and 5 units of good conduct—making conduct mostly
bad—then the 40 percentage point increase in bad conduct that enforcers fail to
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B. DOES THE DE FACTO ADOPTION OF PER SE RULES OF LEGALITY BY
ENFORCERS REALLY INCREASE ERROR COSTS?
The argument in this Article has also so far glossed over another
important question: how do we know that the use of per se rules of
legality by enforcers to cover the enforcement costs associated with
converting rules of per se illegality to rules of reason actually does increase error costs after taking the reduction in error costs brought
about by the conversion of per se rules of illegality to rules of reason
into account? The argument so far has emphasized that converting
rules of reason to rules of per se legality increases error costs when
conduct is mostly bad. But the overall effect on error costs depends on
the magnitude of the error costs created by converting rules of per se
illegality to rules of reason. If converting per se rules of illegality to
rules of reason greatly reduces error costs, then the reductions may
fully offset any error cost increases associated with the adoption of
per se rules of legality.
I touched on the broader issue of the relative error cost effects of
different kinds of rule conversions briefly in Part V, in which I argued
that the Court’s conversion of rules of reason to rules of per se legality
would not offset the increase in error costs associated with converting
rules of per se illegality to rules of reason combined with the adoption
of per se rules of legality that enforcers would have undertaken in order to balance their enforcement budgets. But there, too, I assumed
that the conversion of rules of per se illegality to rules of reason, combined with the use of rules of per se legality to balance the budget, increase error costs. But do they?
The answer is yes, if the assumption that the rule of reason is unbiased and accurate continues to hold and if the underlying conduct is
sufficiently bad.225 I provide a mathematical explanation in the Appendix; here is the explanation in words.

identify would allow 4 units of bad conduct to go uncondemned, and the 20 percentage
point reduction in good conduct that enforcers fail to identify would cause only 2 fewer
units of good conduct to be erroneously condemned. Error costs would, therefore, actually rise. By contrast, if the rule of reason were to fail to identify bad conduct 20% of
the time and to fail to identify good conduct 20% of the time—making it an unbiased
and reasonably accurate rule—then converting a rule of per se illegality to a rule of
reason would increase the amount of bad conduct that escapes condemnation by 20
percentage points—2 units of conduct—but reduce the amount of good conduct that
is erroneously condemned by 80 percentage points—4 units of conduct—so the benefits would outweigh the costs and, overall, error costs would fall, just as we have assumed throughout this Article.
225. For that assumption, see supra Section VII.A.
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1. The Error Costs of Balancing the Budget by Converting Rules of
Reason to Rules of Per Se Legality
When enforcers go to adopt per se rules of legality to balance
their budgets, they have two options: they can convert rules of reason
into per se rules of legality or they can convert per se rules of illegality
into per se rules of legality (or they can do some of both). Let us start
with rules of reason and assume that, to balance their enforcement
budgets, enforcers wish to convert to rules of per se legality the same
conduct converted by the Court from rules of per se illegality to rules
of reason (recall that the reason for which enforcers are seeking to
balance their budgets is that the Court has converted rules of per se
illegality to rules of reason). In this case, the net effect of the two rule
changes—the Court’s conversion of rules of per se illegality to rules of
reason and enforcers’ conversion of those rules of reason to rules of
per se legality with respect to the same conduct—will be to convert
rules of per se illegality for a given set of conduct to rules of per se
legality for the same conduct, with rules of reason as the intermediate
step in the process. This will not balance the budget, however, because
converting rules of per se illegality to rules of per se legality, which
amounts to stopping enforcement of any kind with respect to the conduct at issue, necessarily reduces enforcement costs. Because enforcement costs vary with the amount of conduct to which a rule applies,
enforcers must therefore convert less conduct from rules of reason to
rules of per se legality than the Court converts from rules of per se
illegality to rules of reason in order to balance the budget. That will
shrink the enforcement cost savings from converting per se rules of
illegality to per se rules of legality until those savings just offset the
enforcement cost increases associated with converting per se rules of
illegality to rules of reason. To determine the net error cost effects of
this approach, we must, therefore, consider the error cost effects of
two different rule conversions: the conversion of rules of per se illegality to rules of per se legality for part of the conduct, and the conversion of rules of per se illegality to rules of reason for the remaining
part, which enforcers do not convert to per se rules of legality because
they do not wish to run a net savings in enforcement costs.
The net error costs of these two rule conversions are these. Converting per se rules of illegality to per se rules of legality obviously
increases error costs if conduct is mostly bad: consumers are better
off if conduct that is mostly bad is illegal as opposed to legal. And we
have already seen that converting per se rules of illegality to rules of
reason increases error costs if our assumptions about how rules of
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reason function in fact hold.226 So error costs go up for both rule conversions and therefore the conversion of rules of per se illegality to
rules of reason, combined with the conversion of rules of reason to per
se rules of legality by enforcers seeking to balance their enforcement
budgets, results in error cost increases.
This result holds even if, contrary to our assumption, the conduct
that enforcers convert to per se rules of legality is not the same as the
conduct the Court converts to rules of reason. Recall the argument in
Part III that the Court views all ambiguous conduct as having the same
character. It follows that we can always think of any two rule changes
as applying to the same conduct even when they do not because the
underlying conduct is undifferentiated in character: all that is needed
to determine the net effect of any two rule changes is the nature of the
changes and the amount of conduct they affect. The particular conduct
they affect does not matter.
2. The Error Costs of Balancing the Budget by Converting Rules of
Per Se Illegality to Rules of Per Se Legality
Let us now see what happens when enforcers convert rules of per
se illegality, rather than rules of reason, into rules of per se legality in
order to balance their enforcement budgets. The argument is best
made in reference to our earlier example, in which an unbiased and
reasonably accurate rule of reason fails to identify 20% of good conduct and 20% of bad conduct. In that case, the Court’s conversion of a
per se rule of illegality to the rule of reason would increase the percent
of bad conduct that escapes condemnation by 20 percentage points
and reduce the amount of good conduct that is erroneously condemned by 80 percentage points. The switch from a per se rule of illegality to a per se rule of legality to balance enforcement budgets
would, then, increase the percent of bad conduct that escapes condemnation by 100 percentage points and reduce the amount of good
conduct erroneously condemned by 100 percentage points. Because
the amounts and character of the conduct subject to the two rule conversions are the same, we can sum the percentage point changes associated with each of them to conclude that, altogether, we have an
increase in bad conduct that escapes condemnation of 120 percentage
points and an increase in good conduct that is no longer erroneously
condemned of 180 percentage points.
If converting equal amounts of conduct from per se rules of illegality to per se rules of legality were sufficient to offset the
226. See supra Section VII.A.
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enforcement cost of converting per se rules of illegality to rules of reason, then conduct would need to be very bad, not just mostly bad, before error costs would increase, since, as we have just seen, the reductions in erroneous condemnation of good conduct that result from
these rule changes are much larger than the increases in bad conduct
that goes uncondemned that result from these rule changes. For example, if there were 6 units of bad conduct and 5 units of good conduct
in the conduct converted from per se rules of illegality to rules of reason, and the same amounts again in the conduct converted from per
se rules of illegality to per se rules of legality (because we assume that
all conduct is uniform in harmfulness), then 7.2 more units of bad conduct would go free as a result of these rules changes, whereas 9 more
units of good conduct would escape condemnation as a result of these
rule changes. The benefits would, therefore, exceed the costs, and
overall error costs would fall even though the underlying conduct is
more than half bad (6 units of bad to 5 units of good). For error costs
to rise there would need to be much more bad conduct relative to
good: error costs would rise, for example, were there to be 10 units of
bad conduct and 5 units of good conduct, as we assumed at the start
of this Part.
But that is not the end of the story, because converting equal
amounts of conduct from per se rules of illegality to per se rules of
legality does not fully offset enforcement costs. Rules of reason are
likely to be much more expensive to enforce than per se rules of illegality, so the savings associated with avoiding the enforcement costs
of per se rules of illegality for a particular amount of conduct will not
cover the cost of converting per se rules of illegality to rules of reason
for an equal amount of conduct. It follows that more conduct must be
converted from per se rules of illegality to per se rules of legality than
is converted from per se rules of illegality to rules of reason in order
for enforcement budgets fully to balance.
The greater the amount of conduct that must be converted from
per se rules of illegality to per se rules of legality, however, the more
equal the error rates for bad and good conduct must become. Conversions of rules of per se illegality to rules of per se legality increase error with respect to bad conduct by 100% and reduce error with respect to good conduct by 100%, which means that if conduct is mostly
bad, these conversions increase error costs. As more conduct is converted from per se rules of illegality to per se rules of legality, the error
cost effects of these conversions will increasingly dominate the error
effects of the conversion of per se rules of illegality to rules of reason,
reducing the amount of bad conduct relative to good conduct required
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for overall error costs to increase. Thus if, in our example, an additional amount of conduct equal to the amount originally converted
from per se rules of illegality to rules of reason is converted from per
se rules of illegality to per se rules of legality to balance the budget,
then error identifying bad conduct must rise from 120 percentage
points to 220 percentage points and error identifying good conduct
must rise from 180 percentage points to 280 percentage points, increasing the ratio of these error rates from 0.67 to nearly 0.8, and
hence reducing the ratio of bad to good conduct needed for error costs
to rise.227 As more conduct is converted from rules of per se illegality
to rules of per se legality, that latter ratio will approach one, which
means that conduct need only be slightly more bad than good for error
costs to increase.
How close that latter ratio will come to one depends ultimately
on the relative enforcement costs of rules of reason and per se rules
of illegality. If rules of reason were infinitely costly to enforce, then the
ratio would go to one in the limit, because enforcers would need to
convert an infinite amount of conduct from per se rules of illegality to
per se rules of legality in order to pay for converting some conduct
from inexpensive per se rules of illegality to infinitely expensive rules
of reason. Because rules of reason are not infinitely more expensive to
enforce than are per se rules of illegality, however, the ratio will end
up being close to but still somewhat greater than one, and so, by
“mostly bad” conduct, I have meant, throughout this paper, not conduct that is just slightly more than half bad but conduct that is sufficiently more than half bad to make error costs increase when per se
rules of illegality are converted to rules of reason and enforcers balance their enforcement budgets by converting per se rules of illegality
to per se rules of legality.
Of course, enforcers will not necessarily convert per se rules of
illegality to per se rules of legality in attempting to balance their budgets. They may convert rules of reason to per se rules of legality instead,
or convert a combination of both. The overall error cost effects will,
however, just be the sum of the error cost effects of each type of
budget-balancing conversion. As we have seen, both types of budgetbalancing conversion—from rules of reason to per se rules of legality
and from per se rules of illegality to per se rules of legality—result in
increases in error costs when considered together with the conversion of per se rules of illegality to rules of reason that they are meant
227. The ratio of bad to good conduct required for error costs to rise is the reciprocal of the ratio of the error percentage for bad conduct to the error percentage for
good conduct.
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to offset. So their sum will reflect an increase in error costs as well. It
follows that the adoption of per se rules of legality by enforcers seeking to pay for the Court’s conversion of rules of per se illegality to rules
of reason really does increase error costs—so long, of course, as the
underlying conduct is mostly bad.
C. APPLYING THE ANALYSIS TO OTHER POSSIBLE RULE CHANGES
Reasoning along the foregoing lines makes it possible to map out
the error cost effects, subject to an enforcement budget constraint, of
all possible rule changes, not just the conversion of rules of per se illegality to rules of reason. The results are summarized in Table 1. One
lesson the table teaches is that rolling back the rule of reason presumption in future will require special care.228 In Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., for example, the Court overturned a per se rule
of legality for reverse payment patent settlements—settlements of patent litigation between branded and generic drug makers pursuant to
which the branded drug maker pays the generic maker to stay out of
the market—in favor of a rule of reason approach.229 Advocates of antitrust condemnation of these settlements, which seem rather transparently to constitute market division, celebrated the new approach
as good for consumers because these advocates believed the conduct
to be mostly bad for consumers and imposition of rule of reason treatment therefore to be an improvement upon the former policy of doing
nothing about the conduct.230

228. This and the other results described in this Part are also described mathematically in Proposition 2 in the Appendix.
229. 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2230, 2237–38 (2013).
230. See Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill, Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, The Actavis Inference: Theory and Practice, 67 RUTGERS L. REV. 585, 620 (2015); Aaron Edlin,
Scott Hemphill, Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Actavis and Error Costs: A Reply to
Critics, 14 ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 7 (2014). The settlements divide markets because they
effectively keep the generic drug makers out of the branded drug market before expiration of the branded drug company’s contested patent. See Ramsi A. Woodcock, Innovation and Reverse Payments, 44 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 773, 782–89 (2017) (explaining how
reverse payment patent settlements work). Thus, the agreements divide access to the
market over time. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 601, 608 (1972)
(treating territorial divisions as so bad for consumers as to merit per se condemnation).
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The Changes in Error Costs Brought About by Rule Changes Subject to an Enforcement Budget Constraint
To
Per Se Rule of Illegality

Per Se Rule of Legality

Rule of Reason

When only enforcement reductions are available to balance the
budget: error costs increase.

From

Per Se Rule of
Legality

No change.

Error costs decrease.

Per Se Rule
of Illegality

Error costs increase.

No change.

Error costs increase.

Error costs decrease.

No change.

When conversions of rules of reason to per se rules of illegality are
available: error costs may decrease.

When only enforcement
increases are available to
balance the budget: error
costs decrease.
Rule of Reason

When conversions of per
se rules of illegality to
rules of reason are available: error costs may increase.

Table 1
The table gives the effect on error costs (i.e., harm to consumers) of rule
changes subject to an enforcement budget constraint, assuming that the
underlying conduct is “mostly bad” (in the sense of Proposition 1 in the
Appendix that

!!
!"

>

"# #"$ $ %

($#&)"# #"$ $ %

). All listed rule changes can also cause

no change in error costs if courts or enforcers balance budgets by employing rule changes in the opposite direction from that listed, such as
by responding to conversion of a per se rule of illegality to a rule of reason by converting a rule of reason to a per se rule of illegality.

The table teaches, however, that the only way this rule change
could have helped consumers is if the Court had undertaken to pay for
it by explicitly converting some rules of reason to rules of per se illegality to cover for the cost of converting the old rule of per se legality
for reverse payment patent settlements to a rule of reason. The Court
did not, however, do that. Absent that change, enforcers must have responded to the conversion of the per se rule of legality to the rule of
reason by reducing enforcement of rules of reason, rules of per se illegality, or both (they could not have responded by converting rules of

2154

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[105:2095

reason to rules of per se illegality themselves because they cannot
change the law). As the table reports, the result was to increase error
costs.
D. CAN ENFORCERS EFFECTIVELY CHANGE LEGAL RULES?
The inability of enforcers to use conversions between rules of
reason and per se rules of illegality to balance enforcement budgets
has figured prominently in the account of error costs in this Article,
both in the conclusion that the Court’s conversion of rules of per se
legality to rules of reason in recent decades has tended to cause enforcers to create de facto rules of per se legality, and in the conclusion
that the Court’s Actavis decision did not reduce error costs because
enforcers could not have funded enforcement of the decision by converting rules of reason to rules of per se illegality.231
The careful reader may object, however, to the assumption that
enforcers cannot convert between rules of reason and rules of per se
illegality, on the ground that any enforcer can make such a rule change
in two steps using rules of per se legality—which enforcers do have
the power either to create, through non-enforcement, or to eliminate,
by ramping up enforcement—as the middle term. To convert from
rules of reason to rules of per se illegality, for example, enforcers need
only, first, to reduce enforcement of rules of reason with respect to
one category of conduct, and, second, to use the cost savings generated
thereby in part to fund the ramping up of enforcement of rules of per
se illegality for another category of conduct. The net result is to substitute rules of per se illegality for rules of reason. Because rules of
reason are more expensive than rules of per se illegality, enforcers will
experience a net reduction in costs, but the amount will be identical to
the reduction in costs associated with any direct conversion of rules
of reason to rules of per se illegality. Because all ambiguous conduct
is assumed to be undifferentiated in terms of harmfulness to consumers, the net result of the two-step process is to produce the same
change in error costs as would be produced by direct conversion of
rules of reason to rules of per se illegality.232 Thus enforcers can produce the same error cost effects as could the Court, despite lacking the
Court’s legal power to change rules of reason to rules of per se illegality, simply by exercising the enforcer’s power to expand or contract
enforcement of any rules.233
231. See supra Sections I, VII.C.
232. For the undifferentiated character of conduct, see supra Parts III–IV.
233. Enforcers are not, however, always at liberty to expand the enforcement of
rules, and this restricts the freedom of enforcers to convert between rules of reason

2021]

A MODEST ANTITRUST

2155

This argument is sound as an analytic matter, but the argument
has practical effect only if enforcers in fact use this two-step process
as a budget-balancing device, something that seems unlikely. Enforcers can be expected to ramp up enforcement in the face of budget surpluses and to roll enforcement back in the face of budget shortfalls,
but not to ramp enforcement up during shortfalls, as they would need
to do in part in order to produce conversions between rules of reason
and rules of per se illegality for purposes of balancing enforcement
budgets.
VIII. MODIFYING THE RULE OF REASON IS NOT ENOUGH
The growing number of voices calling for a solution to the antitrust enforcement drought have so far called only for reform of the
rule of reason, rather than for the rule’s demise and a return to the
rules of per se illegality that characterized mid-twentieth century antitrust.234 The case for reform is premised on the very real connection
between the costliness of proving or disproving harm under rules of
reason and the bias of rules of reason against plaintiffs.235 As the burden that must be met to prove or disprove harm under the rule of reason becomes costlier to meet, plaintiffs, who traditionally have the
burden of proof, find it harder and harder to win cases even when the
defendant has engaged in bad conduct. Because the difficulty of proving harm also implies that few instances of good conduct will be erroneously condemned by the courts, the result is that, contrary to the
assumption generally employed in this Article, the rule of reason will
and rules of per se illegality. If enforcers are already fully enforcing existing rules of
per se illegality, for example, then there is no way for enforcers effectively to convert
per se rules of legality into per se rules of illegality by starting to enforce per se rules
of illegality more vigorously than before. It follows that the extent to which enforcers
are already fully enforcing existing laws determines the extent to which enforcers can
use per se rules of legality as the middle term in converting between rules of reason
and rules of per se illegality.
234. See Sandeep Vaheesan, Resurrecting “A Comprehensive Charter of Economic
Liberty”: The Latent Power of the Federal Trade Commission, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 645, 676–
78 (2017) (calling for “presumptions of illegality” but not “categorical prohibitions”);
Stucke, supra note 6, at 1483–87; Baker, Economics and Politics, supra note 1, at 2186
(arguing that antitrust balancing should be adjusted to favor consumers more than it
does at present); Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49, 110 (2007); Andrew I. Gavil & Steven C. Salop, Probability, Presumptions and Evidentiary Burdens in Antitrust Analysis: Revitalizing the Rule of Reason
for Exclusionary Conduct, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 2107, 2131–42 (2020); Erik Hovenkamp &
Steven C. Salop, Asymmetric Stakes in Antitrust Litigation 3 (Univ. of S. Cal. Ctr. for L. &
Soc. Sci. Rsch. Papers Series, No. CLASS20-12, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
3563843 [https://perma.cc/2AMH-GSCT].
235. See Nealis, supra note 18, at 366–70.
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tend to allow more bad conduct to escape condemnation than it
causes good conduct to be erroneously condemned.236 Taken to an extreme, this burden on plaintiffs will cause plaintiffs (meaning enforcers) to stop bringing cases and rules of reason to become de facto rules
of per se legality.237 At the other extreme, if the Court responds to the
high cost of proving harm by shifting the burden of proof to the defendant, then plaintiffs will always win and the rule of reason will become a rule of per se illegality.238
Reform of the rule of reason, through a shifting of part of the burden of proof to the defendant, can eliminate this bias.239 But rule of
reason reform cannot eliminate the separate problem that lies at the
heart of this Article: the enforcement costs that the rule of reason adds
to the process of identifying which cases to bring, as opposed to the
litigation costs of winning cases once they are brought.240 Enforcement costs would remain even were the entire burden of proof to be
placed on defendants and litigation costs for plaintiffs consequently to
go to zero: enforcers would still need to worry about the serious reputational harms associated with losing cases and so they would still
need to invest in deciding which cases to bring.241 Moreover, the rule
of reason would still be costlier to enforce than per se rules. Enforcers
would still need to know enough about consumer harm in any potential rule of reason case to determine whether defendants would be
able to meet their burden of disproving the existence of consumer
harm, and so enforcers would still need to investigate consumer harm
in rule of reason cases. But enforcers would not need to do so for cases
involving per se rules, which have no harm requirement. The conversion of rules of per se illegality to rules of reason would therefore still
drive up enforcement costs. And so, as this Article has shown, enforcers would still be forced to reduce enforcement and potentially to increase error costs.242 A fortiori, the enforcement cost problem would
also not go away were the rule of reason to be reformed to place the
236. See id.; Stucke, supra note 6, at 1460–65. For the assumption of an unbiased
rule of reason made by this Article, see supra Section VII.A.
237. See Nealis, supra note 18, at 366–70.
238. See Katsoulacos & Ulph, On Optimal Legal Standards for Competition Policy,
supra note 109, at 420.
239. See Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 1, at 103 (calling for “appropriately biased”
presumptions); Stucke, supra note 6, at 1483–87.
240. See supra Parts I–III.
241. See Kovacic, supra note 20, at 246, 253–54 (discussing the importance, to the
building an effective administrative “brand,” of “quality control” in case selection by
administrative agencies).
242. See supra Part VII.
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burden of proof equally on plaintiffs and defendants; the continued
existence of litigation costs for plaintiffs in this case would just make
the enforcement budget constraint even tighter. Indeed, this entire Article has been built around demonstrating the enforcement cost problem in precisely this case. When burdens of proof are shared equally,
the rule of reason should be unbiased: it should be just as good at identifying good conduct as it is at identifying bad conduct. But we saw in
Part VII that converting rules of per se illegality to rules of reason increases error costs under an enforcement budget constraint when the
rule of reason is unbiased.243 Thus enforcement costs will continue to
pose a problem even after rule of reason reform is complete and regardless of the form that rule of reason reform takes.244
In reducing litigation costs, rule of reason reform would loosen
enforcers’ budget constraints to some extent, since enforcers do not
only scout cases, they also go to court and try to win them. But that
would not mean that rule of reason reform would allow the Court to
ignore enforcement budgets, even were the litigation cost savings so
vast as to enable enforcers fully to enforce the rule of reason on all
ambiguous conduct. That is because at the same time that the Court
embraces rule of reason reform by reallocating the burden of proof
between plaintiffs and defendants, the Court might also choose to increase the burden of proof for all parties. The increase in the burden
of proof may not sop up all of the litigation cost savings plaintiffs might
enjoy thanks to the reallocation of burdens between plaintiffs and defendants. But the increase in the burden will also increase enforcement costs, because enforcers will, in anticipation of needing to meet
the higher evidentiary burden once cases begin, need to be more careful in identifying consumer harm before bringing cases. And the increase in enforcement costs may exhaust any remaining litigation cost
savings associated with the reallocation of proof burdens, restoring
the enforcement budget constraint.
The Court might want to increase proof burdens at the same time
that the Court reallocates them between plaintiffs and defendants because a more accurate rule of reason can be good for consumers even
if the additional enforcement costs the rule creates make it necessary
to reintroduce some per se rules.245 The reduction in error costs associated with the increase in accuracy of the rules of reason may well
exceed the increase in error costs associated with subjecting some
243. See supra Sections VII.A–B.
244. But see Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 1, at 102 (“[F]ull-blown rule-of-reason
analysis must be preferable to categorical presumptions.”).
245. This novel result is proven mathematically in Proposition 5 in the Appendix.
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conduct to per se treatment in order to pay for the more accurate rules
of reason. But this will be true only if the per se rules that are actually
applied are properly tailored to the character of the underlying conduct. If the conduct is mostly bad, then the per se rules must be per se
rules of illegality in order for error costs to fall, or to fall as much as
possible. Thus even were rule of reason reform to eliminate the enforcement budget constraint, the Court might want to reimpose it by
increasing proof burdens and hence enforcement costs, and indeed
might want to divide conduct between rules of reason and per se rules.
But this will work, and consumers will benefit—other than by accident—only if the Court takes the budget constraint that the Court reimposes into account in choosing which per se rules to apply, rather
than ignoring the problem and leaving it to enforcers always to apply
per se rules of legality by default.
CONCLUSION
Antitrust is unique in the kid-glove attention to justice that it provides to defendants through the rule of reason, a level of care so costly
that antitrust must in many cases simply accord defendants the even
greater luxury of not being defendants at all, to the great distress of
consumers if antitrust-relevant conduct is thought on balance to be
harmful to them.246 But for all its faults, is not this kid-glove treatment
a rational response to the fact that the stakes in antitrust cases are
usually much higher than the stakes in other areas of the law?247 In
contract law cases, for example, the fate of only one firm—one that
may have only a small role in any given market—normally hangs in
the balance.248 But because of antitrust’s orientation toward policing
market power, the fate of the largest firms or groups of firms in the
economy often hangs in the balance in antitrust cases, and so it would
seem to make sense that antitrust should exercise particular care in
adjudication relative to other fields of law.
This argument places dollars over lives, of course. The criminal
law is more per-se-rule-bound than perhaps any other area of the law,
and liberty, not just property, hangs in the balance in criminal cases.249
246. See, e.g., Grullon et al., supra note 1, at 700, 702 fig.1 (showing that U.S. industries are becoming more concentrated).
247. I thank Andreas Engert for bringing this argument to my attention.
248. See CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G. PRINCE, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1093–95 (9th ed. 2019) (pointing out that as a general
matter contract law implicates only the rights of the parties to a contract).
249. See, e.g., Eric Colvin, Exculpatory Defences in Criminal Law, 10 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 381, 388 (1990) (“Only a few, particularly powerful contextual excuses, such as
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But there is no rule of reason in criminal law: those who kill with malice aforethought are condemned, regardless the social value of the killing—whether people were happier with the victim gone or not. If the
life of an individual human defendant—who may be subject to capital
punishment—is as important as the profits of any corporation, then
we would expect similar kid glove treatment of defendants in criminal
cases. But we do not. But perhaps this just means that the criminal law
needs its own antitrust revolution, to become more oriented toward
doing justice in the individual case and less obsessed with per se rules,
such as the rule prohibiting all killing with malice aforethought.250
The real problem with the argument that the higher the stakes
the more careful should be the adjudication is that the argument focuses exclusively on the costs associated with erroneously condemning good conduct and leaves out of the balance the costs of failing to
condemn bad conduct. The bigger the firm, the greater the harm of
unjustly destroying it, but also the greater the harm the firm can do to
consumers if the firm turns out in fact to be rotten. It is never the size
of the stakes alone that matters in deciding how much care to exercise
in adjudication, but the relative stakes associated with failing to condemn bad conduct and erroneously condemning good conduct. If the
harm a big firm can do far exceeds the good a big firm can do, regardless how great that good may be in absolute terms, then it may well be
appropriate for budget-constrained enforcers to condemn the firm’s
bad actions without checking to make sure that they really have bad
effects in the particular case at hand. The reason is that enforcers operating under a budget constraint can afford more careful scrutiny
only by reducing enforcement—monitoring the big firm less often.
The harm from allowing the firm to slip through the enforcement net
may vastly exceed the gain from checking to make sure that firms really are engaged in bad conduct when cases are in fact brought. That
is the lesson taught by attention to the enforcement budget constraint.
The rebirth of American antitrust can take place only once the
lesson is learned.

duress, are recognized in criminal law.”).
250. See KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 193, at 387–89.
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IX. APPENDIX
A. ASSUMPTIONS AND BASIC SETUP OF THE MODEL
The arguments in this Article are based on the following mathematical model. In studying the model, the reader may wish to refer to
Section IX.C below, which contains a graphical introduction to the
model.
I divide the universe of conduct for which the Supreme Court is
interested in choosing the error-cost-minimizing rule—which is the
universe of all conduct that the Court perceives to be ambiguous in
harmfulness to consumers251—into good conduct, which benefits consumers, and bad conduct, which harms consumers. Call the total value
to consumers of all good conduct 𝑉( and that of avoiding all bad conduct 𝑉) (the 𝑎 is chosen because bad conduct is anticompetitive). I partition the universe of conduct into 𝐼 mutually exclusive subsets, each
associated with an antitrust rule, indexed by 𝑖, corresponding to value
!
𝑉* ≤ 𝑉( + 𝑉) and share 𝑛* = & of total value 𝑉( + 𝑉) . ∑* 𝑉* = 𝑉( + 𝑉)
!" +!!

and Σ* 𝑛* = 1. Any particular subset of conduct may be subjected to
any of the following rules: a rule of per se illegality, a rule of per se
legality, or a rule of reason.
Let 𝑝, be the share of the value of good conduct that the prevailing
rules destroy and 𝑝,, be the share of the value of bad conduct that the
prevailing rules fail to condemn. Then 𝑝, is “Type I error” and 𝑝,, is
“Type II error.”252 Total error costs are therefore 𝑝, 𝑉( + 𝑝,, 𝑉) . The goal
of policy is to minimize this expression subject to an enforcement
budget constraint to be defined below.
I make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1: The value covered by rule 𝑖 is divided between
good and bad conduct in fixed proportions equal to the overall shares
of good and bad conduct in the universe of conduct. Thus 𝑉* = 𝑛* 𝑉( +
𝑛* 𝑉) , the share of value covered by the rule that is value from good
-& !"
!
conduct is
= " , meaning that it is the same as the overall
-& .!! +!" /

!! +!"

share of good conduct in the universe of conduct, and the share of
!!
value that is value from bad conduct is, similarly, ! +!
, the same as
!

"

the overall share of bad conduct in the universe of conduct. This is the
assumption, described in Parts III and IV of this Article, that the Court
perceives all conduct to be uniform in harmfulness. □
251. See supra Part III.
252. See supra note 1.
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Assumption 2: The error costs associated with antitrust rules
are these. If rule 𝑖 is a per se rule of illegality, the rule wipes out all of
the good conduct associated with the rule. Rule 𝑖 in this case eliminates value 𝑛* 𝑉( . If rule 𝑖 is a per se rule of legality, the rule allows all
bad conduct associated with the rule to take place, and therefore inflicts error cost 𝑛* 𝑉) on consumers. If rule 𝑖 is a rule of reason, then it
may have any kind of error cost effect, depending on how the rule of
reason is structured. The rule might, for example, preclude some good
conduct and allow some bad, or the rule might have an identical effect
to that of a per se rule of illegality or a per se rule of legality. I will
impose restrictions on the behavior of rules of reason shortly. □
Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 permit a more detailed characterization of total error costs. Define Σ*001(20*34 , Σ01(20*34 , and Σ51267- to
mean summation over all 𝑖 for which the rule is a per se rule of illegality, per se rule of legality, or rule of reason, respectively, and 𝑟*, and 𝑟*,,
to be the share of the value of good or bad conduct, respectively, destroyed or realized by a rule of reason with respect to the conduct to
which the rule is applied. It follows that 𝑝, = Σ*001(20*34 𝑛* + Σ51267- 𝑟*,
and 𝑝,, = Σ01(20*34 𝑛* + Σ51267- 𝑟*,, . Substituting into 𝑝, 𝑉( + 𝑝,, 𝑉) , total
error costs are therefore 0Σ*001(20*34 𝑛* + Σ51267- 𝑟*, 1𝑉$ + (Σ89:;8<=> 𝑛* +
Σ51267- 𝑟*,, )𝑉) .
Let 𝑅 index the “intensity” of the rule of reason, meaning the ability of the rule of reason to distinguish good from bad conduct.
Assumption 3: For a given 𝑅, the shares of good and bad conduct
destroyed by a rule of reason are constant, regardless of the subset of
conduct to which the rule is applied. Furthermore, the error costs of
the rule of reason are declining in rule of reason intensity. □
It follows from the uniformity of the rule of reason described by
Assumption 3 that there need be no subscript on 𝑅 and that the subscripts on 𝑟*, and 𝑟*,, may be dropped. Let 𝑛, = Σ*001(20*34 𝑛* and 𝑛,, =
Σ01(20*34 𝑛* . Because there are only three types of rules, Σ51267- 𝑛* must
be 1 − 𝑛, − 𝑛,, . It follows by Assumption 3 that Σ51267- 𝑟*, = (1 − 𝑛, −
𝑛,, )𝑟 , and Σ51267- 𝑟*,, = (1 − 𝑛, − 𝑛,, )𝑟 ,, . Total error costs then become [(1 − 𝑛, − 𝑛,, )𝑟 , + 𝑛, ]𝑉( + [(1 − 𝑛, − 𝑛,, )𝑟 ,, + 𝑛,, ]𝑉) , in which
the bracketed coefficient of 𝑉) is again 𝑝,, and that of 𝑉( is again 𝑝, .
Assumption 4: The marginal enforcement cost of a rule is constant in the share of total value that is subject to the rule. Per se rules
of legality have no enforcement cost and the marginal cost of enforcing a per se rule of illegality is less than that of enforcing a rule of reason. The marginal enforcement cost of a rule of reason is increasing in
rule of reason intensity, which means that the greater the care that
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goes into applying a rule of reason, the greater the cost of applying the
rule. □
The general form of a budget constraint that meets the Assumption 4 requirement that marginal cost be constant over all conduct
covered by a rule is 𝐵 = 𝐶2 𝑛, + 𝐶(𝑅)(1 − 𝑛, − 𝑛,, ), where 𝐵 is the total enforcement budget, 𝐶2 is the constant marginal cost of a per se
rule of illegality, and 𝐶(𝑅) > 0 is the marginal cost of the rule of reason, and is a function of rule of reason intensity 𝑅 (which does not vary
with respect to the value of conduct to which the rule of reason is applied, per Assumption 3). Also, by Assumption 4, 𝐶 ? (𝑅) > 0.
Assumption 5: The rule of reason is not biased. That is, the rule
precludes a share of good conduct that equals the share of bad conduct
that the rule allows to occur. □
Assumption 6: Take 𝐶$ 𝑅, where 𝐶$ is a positive constant, as the
functional form of the marginal cost of a rule of reason. That is: 𝐶(𝑅) =
𝐶$ 𝑅. And take rule of reason error cost to be $& 0𝑉( + 𝑉) 1. □
-&

0𝑉( + 𝑉) 1 describes an unbiased rule, as required by Assumption 5. The proportions of total good or bad value within the rule’s
coverage area that the rule precludes are equal. Thus the rule pre$

cludes

'&
!
$ "

-& !"

'&

!!

&

= -$ ! = $ of the value of good or bad conduct within its
& !

coverage area.
Taking 𝐶$ 𝑅 as the functional form of the marginal cost of a rule of
reason, as required by Assumption 6, satisfies the requirement of Assumption 4 that 𝐶 ? (𝑅) > 0. To further comply with Assumption 4,
which requires that rules of reason be more expensive than rules of
per se illegality, set 𝐶$ 𝑅 > 𝐶2 . The budget constraint is therefore 𝐵 =
𝐶2 𝑛, + 𝐶$ 𝑅(1 − 𝑛, − 𝑛,, ).
Assumption 7: The rule of reason is more accurate than either
per se rules of illegality or per se rules of legality in the sense that the
rule of reason cannot cause more harm to consumers than would a per
se rule of illegality or a per se rule of legality applied to the same conduct. □
Imposing the requirement 𝑅 > 2 brings the model into agreement with Assumption 7. The total of the shares of good and bad value
@
destroyed by the rule of reason is $. If 𝑅 > 2, this total can never equal
or exceed 1. The share of the value of good conduct destroyed by a per
-& !"
se rule of illegality is - ! = 1 and the same for the share of the value
& "

of bad conduct allowed by a per se rule of legality. If 𝑅 > 2, a rule of
reason therefore results in error less than that created by either per
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se rule, as we would expect of a rule that is meant to be more accurate
than per se rules.
&#-( –-((
&
From Assumption 3, Σ51267- & =
. So 𝑝, = [𝑛, (𝑅 − 1) +
$

&

$

$

1 − 𝑛,, ] and 𝑝,, = $ [𝑛,, (𝑅 − 1) + 1 − 𝑛, ]. It is also useful to solve this
&

system for 𝑛, and 𝑛,, . The results are that 𝑛, = $#@ [𝑝, (𝑅 − 1) + 𝑝,, −
&

1] and 𝑛,, = $#@ [𝑝,, (𝑅 − 1) + 𝑝, − 1].

The set of attainable combinations of 𝑝, and 𝑝,, is limited. Each
choice of rules involves a tradeoff. Switching from a per se rule of legality to a per se rule of illegality drives 𝑝,, down but 𝑝, up. Switching
from a per se rule of illegality to a rule of reason drives 𝑝, down but
𝑝,, up. And so on. The lowest 𝑝,, attainable for a given 𝑝, occurs when
𝑛,, , which contributes to 𝑝,, at the high rate of 𝑅 − 1, is zero.
Setting 𝑛,, to zero in the expression for 𝑛,, above and solving for
&#C
𝑝,, yields 𝑝,, = $#&(, which gives the lower bound on 𝑝,, . Observing
that the lowest 𝑝, obtainable comes when 𝑛, is zero, it is clear that
&#C
𝑝, = $#&(( is the lower bound on 𝑝, . Because 𝑅 > 2, 𝑝, and 𝑝,, cannot
sum to more than 1. The line 𝑝, + 𝑝,, = 1 therefore defines maximum
values for 𝑝, and 𝑝,, , which occur when there is no rule of reason.
Taken together with the lower bounds on 𝑝, and 𝑝,, , this defines a
closed feasible set. It is the triangle 𝑑𝐵𝑏 in Figure 2.
B. FIXED RULE OF REASON INTENSITY AND UNAFFORDABLE FULL COVERAGE
Proposition 1: When the enforcement budget is too small to permit application of the rule of reason to all conduct, either a regime in
which there are no per se rules of legality is optimal or a regime in
which there are no per se rules of illegality is optimal, except in a special case.
Discussion: I wish to choose 𝑝, and 𝑝,, to minimize error costs
𝑝, 𝑉( + 𝑝,, 𝑉) over the feasible set, subject to the constraint that cost is
fixed at some budget level 𝐵 that is too small to meet full rule of reason
DC
coverage cost 𝐶$ 𝑅. Implicitly differentiating error cost, I obtain DC ( =
((

!!

− ! . The budget-neutral rate of substitution of 𝑝, for 𝑝,, may be de"

termined by substituting the expressions for 𝑝, and 𝑝,, derived above
into the cost function (the budget constraint) and implicitly differentiating to obtain

DC(
DC((

" #" $ %

#
$
= − ($#&)"
#"
#

$$

%

. Because the rates of substitu-

tion of 𝑝, for 𝑝,, in the objective function (error cost) and the constraint are both constant, there is a “corner solution” unless the rates
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are equal. If they are equal, all points on the budget constraint lying
within the feasible set are optimal. If they are not equal, then the opti&#C
mal point is the intersection of 𝑝, = $#&(( and the budget constraint
&

when $#& <

!!
!"

" #" $ %

#
$
< ($#&)"
#"
#

$$

%

and 𝑝, = 0 and 𝑝,, = 1 when

!!
!"

&

< $#&.

This is the case in which an antitrust regime incorporating no per se
rules of illegality is optimal. The optimal point will be the intersection
&#C
!
of 𝑝,, = $#&( and the budget constraint when 𝑅 − 1 > !! >
"

"# #"$ $ %

!!

($#&)"# #"$ $ %

and 𝑝, = 1 and 𝑝,, = 0 when ! > 𝑅 − 1. This is the case
"

in which an antitrust regime incorporating no per se rules of legality
!
&
!
is optimal. I note that when ! <
or ! > 𝑅 − 1 the optimal rule is
!"

$#&

!"

independent of the size of the budget. The reader may wish to consult
Section IX.D below and Figure 2 for a graphical explanation of this result. □
Proposition 2: The relative rates of substitution of 𝑝, for 𝑝,, for
each possible rule change, as well as budget-neutral combinations of
rule changes, which are reflected in the slopes of the solid lines in Figure 2, are, in absolute value: rule of reason to per se rule of legality <
per se rule of illegality to per se rule of legality < budget-neutral rule
changes that increase 𝑝,, and reduce 𝑝, < per se rule of illegality to rule
of reason. The foregoing assumes a fixed rule of reason intensity 𝑅 >
2. The error cost effects of all possible rule changes, assuming a fixed
budget constraint insufficient to cover the cost of applying the rule of
reason to all conduct, and incorporating all possible rule changes
needed to balance the budget in response to the given rule change, can
be inferred from these relative rates of substitution. Error cost effects
under the assumption that conduct is “mostly bad” in the sense that
!!
!"

>

"# #"$ $ %

($#&)"# #"$ $ %

, are reported in Table 1.

Discussion: Let us choose the rule of reason intensity index, 𝑅, to
be small enough as to make (𝑅 − 1)𝐶2 − 𝐶$ 𝑅@ , the denominator in
" #" $ %

#
$
− ($#&)"
#"
#

$$

%

, which is the slope of the budget constraint in 𝑝,, that

we identified in the discussion of Proposition 1, negative. Then, using
Assumption 7, we have 2 < 𝑅 <

"$ $ %
"#

+ 1. Recalling from Assumption

4 that 𝐶2 > 𝐶$ 𝑅, we have 𝐶2 − 𝐶$ 𝑅 < 0, and, from our bounds on 𝑅,
(𝑅 − 1)𝐶2 − 𝐶$ 𝑅@ < 0 and |(𝑅 − 1)𝐶2 − 𝐶$ 𝑅@ | < |𝐶2 − 𝐶$ 𝑅@ |, from
which it follows that

"# #"$ $ %

($#&)"# #"$ $ %

> 1. It can easily be shown that
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#
$
under these conditions, 𝑅 − 1 > ($#&)"
#"
#

&#C

$$

2165
&

%

> $#&. From our lower
&#C

bounds on 𝑝, and 𝑝,, , which are 𝑝, = $#&(( and 𝑝,, = $#&(, respectively,
it is clear that 𝑅 − 1 is the absolute value of the slope of the lower
&
bound of 𝑝,, as a function of 𝑝,, , and $#& is the absolute value of the
slope of the lower bound of 𝑝, as a function of 𝑝,, . Given that 𝑅 > 2, we
" #" $ %

#
$
have that 𝑅 − 1 > ($#&)"
#"
#

%
$$

&

> 1 > $#&. Now, the slope of the lower

bound of 𝑝,, is just the rate of substitution of 𝑝, for 𝑝,, when converting rules of per se illegality to rules of reason, unity is the rate of substitution of 𝑝, for 𝑝,, when converting per se rules of illegality to per
&
se rules of legality, and
is the rate of substitution of 𝑝, for 𝑝,, when
$#&
converting rules of reason to per se rules of legality, from which the
first part of the proposition follows immediately. All entries in Table
1 may be inferred by using the effect of the given rule change on 𝑝, and
𝑝,, to define a vector and then summing that vector up with the vectors created by the compensating rule changes required to return the
economy to the budget constraint. Comparing the location of the economy on the budget constraint after the compensating rule changes
have been applied with the starting location of the economy on the
budget constraint, and then determining the value—𝑝, 𝑉( + 𝑝,, 𝑉) —of
the new location of the economy and comparing it with the starting
value gives the changes in error costs described in the table. □
C. VARYING RULE OF REASON INTENSITY
So far rule of reason intensity 𝑅 has been fixed. Now consider the
case in which 𝑅 may vary to minimize error costs. This case played a
role in the argument at the end of Part VIII of this Article. The question
to be answered is whether, in the presence of a budget constraint, a
mix of per se rules of illegality and rules of reason ever reduces error
costs relative to subjecting all conduct to rules of reason. The answer
is that subjecting some conduct to per se rules of illegality can reduce
error costs in this situation.
For simplicity of exposition, and because the focus here is on per
se rules of illegality and rules of reason, not per se rules of legality, it
will be assumed that no conduct is subject to per se rules of legality
(𝑛,, = 0). In other words, the ensuing discussion will find conditions
not for achieving the globally optimal mix of rules but only for achieving the optimal mix conditional on the absence of per se rules of legality.
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The discussion that follows does not initially specify the functional forms of rule of reason error and enforcement costs. Thus Assumption 6 is not initially applied to what follows. This gives the results greater generality than those for the fixed intensity case above.
Once the more general results are presented, the discussion will then
shift, for purposes of reinforcement, to showing that the results hold
under Assumption 6 as well.
With no conduct subject to per se rules of legality, total error
costs become those when conduct is divided exclusively between
rules of reason and per se rules of illegality in amount 𝑛, . Total error
costs are therefore [(1 − 𝑛, )𝑟 , + 𝑛, ]𝑉( + (1 − 𝑛, )𝑟 ,, 𝑉) , which simplifies to (1 − 𝑛, )A𝑟 ,, 𝑉) + 𝑟 , 𝑉( B + 𝑛, 𝑉( . The budget constraint is 𝐵 =
𝐶2 𝑛, + 𝐶(𝑅)(1 − 𝑛, ). From the budget constraint, it is clear that the
funds available to purchase rules of reason, 𝐶(𝑅)(1 − 𝑛, ), are what remains after the cost of per se rules of illegality is deducted from the
budget, 𝐵 − 𝐶2 𝑛, . These funds purchase rules of reason with a level of
intensity 𝑅 that determines the size of the rule of reason error shares,
𝑟 , and 𝑟 ,, . But for a fixed budget and fixed marginal cost of per se rules
of illegality, the amount of these funds is entirely determined by the
amount of conduct subject to per se rules of illegality, 𝑛, . It follows
that 𝑉) 𝑟 ,, + 𝑉( 𝑟 , is a function of 𝑛, , operating indirectly through the
determination of 𝑅.
Define 𝑓(𝑛, ) = 𝑉) 𝑟 ,, + 𝑉( 𝑟 , and, to further simplify notation, 𝜌 =
𝑉$ . I therefore have for total error costs when conduct is divided between rules of reason and per se rules of illegality:
(1 − 𝑛, )𝑓(𝑛, ) + 𝜌𝑛, .

(1)

𝑓(𝑛, ) is the error cost that prevails if no conduct is subject to per se
rules of illegality and rules of reason are applied to all conduct. 𝜌 is the
total over-enforcement harm that is realized if all conduct is per se
illegal.
In more formal terms, 𝑓(𝑛, ) is the composition of 𝑓(𝑅), which is
rule of reason error cost as a function of rule of reason intensity, and
𝑅 = 𝑔(𝑛, , 𝐵), the budget constraint that gives rule of reason intensity
𝑅 as a function of the amount of conduct subject to per se rules of illegality and a fixed enforcement budget 𝐵. 𝑓(𝑛, ) = 𝑓(𝑔(𝑛, )). Thus the
amount of conduct subject to per se rules of illegality determines the
intensity of application of rules of reason and therefore the size of the
error costs that rules of reason are capable of inflicting if applied to all
conduct. For clarity, 𝑓(𝑅) will be referred to here as 𝑓$ , and 𝑓(𝑛, ) as
𝑓, from now on.
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Proposition 3: The general condition for a per se rule of illegality
to achieve lower error cost than a rule of reason is that (1) have a minimum in 𝑛, ∈ (0,1]. Sufficient conditions for this to hold are that
𝑓(0) > 𝜌, or that both 𝑓(0) < 𝜌 and 𝑓 ? (0) < −[𝜌 − 𝑓(0)].
Discussion: When 𝑓(0) > 𝜌, subjecting all conduct to per se rules
of illegality (𝑛, = 1) results in lower error costs than subjecting all
conduct to rules of reason. Subjecting only some conduct to per se
rules of illegality (𝑛, ∈ (0,1)) may give rise to even lower error costs,
depending on the nature of 𝑓(𝑛, ). Regardless, it is clear that, when
𝑓(0) > 𝜌, applying per se rules of illegality to some amount of conduct
reduces error costs relative to applying rules of reason to all conduct
in this case.
When 𝑓(0) < 𝜌, the question becomes whether 𝑓(0) is an error
cost minimum relative to subjecting any amount of conduct to a per se
rule of illegality (i.e., relative to any 𝑛, > 0). If 𝑓(0) is a minimum, then
subjecting any amount of conduct to a per se rule of illegality cannot
achieve lower error costs than a rule of reason. (1) is falling when
E#F(-()
𝑓 ? (𝑛, ) < − H
I. If this holds at 𝑛, = 0, which is to say, if 𝑓 ? (0) <
&#-(

−[𝜌 − 𝑓(0)], then there exists an 𝑛, ∈ (0,1] for which error cost is less
than that at 𝑛, = 0. Under this condition, subjecting some non-zero
amount of conduct to per se rules of illegality reduces error costs. □
Proposition 4: 𝑓 ? (0) < 0.
D$
Discussion: 𝑓 ? (𝑛, ) = 𝑓$? (𝑅)𝑔? (𝑛, ) = 𝑓$? (𝑅) . Implicitly differD-(

entiating the budget constraint with respect to 𝑛, yields
"# #"($)

D$
D-(

=

− (&#- )" )($) , which is positive when 𝐶(𝑅) > 𝐶2 . This establishes for(

mally that an increase in the amount of conduct subject to per se rules
of illegality converts the conduct brought under per se rules of illegality from higher cost rules of reason to lower cost per se rules of illegality, freeing up resources that can be used to purchase greater levels
of intensity for the coverage areas still subject to rules of reason. By
Assumption 2, the error cost of subjecting all conduct to rules of reason as a function of rule of reason intensity, 𝑓$ (𝑅), is falling in rule of
D$
reason intensity. So 𝑓$? (𝑅) < 0. Because 𝑓$? (𝑅) < 0 and D- > 0,
D$

(

𝑓$? (𝑅) D- < 0, and 𝑓(𝑛, ) is therefore falling in 𝑛, . □
(

The lower error cost of subjecting all conduct to per se rules of
illegality in the case in which 𝑓(0) > 𝜌 has been recognized
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elsewhere.253 The focus here is on finding the conditions that create
the less intuitive result that subjecting only part of conduct to per se
rules of illegality is appropriate even when the enforcement budget is
large enough to make subjecting all conduct to rules of reason preferable to subjecting all conduct to per se rules of illegality. I believe that
the results for the case 𝑓(0) < 𝜌 that follows have not been recognized
elsewhere.
Proposition 5: A per se rule of illegality for at least some conduct
is appropriate if (1) error cost reductions associated with small increases in rule of reason intensity are large or (2) if rules of reason are
very expensive relative to per se rules of illegality.
Discussion: Whether 𝑓 ? (0) is sufficiently negative to satisfy
D$
𝑓 ? (0) < −[𝜌 − 𝑓(0)] depends on the magnitudes of 𝑓$? (𝑅) and
. If
D-(

𝑓$? (𝑅) is very negative, which means that small changes in rule of reason intensity greatly reduce error costs, then 𝑓 ? (0) < −[𝜌 − 𝑓(0)] and
subjecting some amount of conduct to per se rules of illegality is apD$
propriate. If D- is very positive, which means that small increases in
(

the amount of conduct subject to per se rules of illegality greatly increase the amount of rule of reason intensity that may be purchased,
then 𝑓 ? (0) < −[𝜌 − 𝑓(0)] and subjecting some amount of conduct to
D$

" #"($)

D$

#
per se rules of illegality is appropriate. Because D- = − (&#,
)" ) ($) D(

(

(

is very positive if 𝐶2 is much smaller than 𝐶(𝑅). □
Note that the case 𝑓(0) < 𝜌 and 𝑓 ? (0) < −[𝜌 − 𝑓(0)] can include
the case in which a rule of reason is “fully biased” in favor of over-enforcement harm and creates no under-enforcement harm (i.e., the
case in which 𝑟 , > 0, 𝑟 ,, = 0). In such a case, if the rule of reason is
more accurate than a per se rule of illegality, then it must inflict less
over-enforcement harm than a per se rule of illegality. It might appear
that a rule of reason is therefore always to be preferred to a per se rule
of illegality. Proposition 5 shows that this is not the case. It shows, for
example, that if the marginal reduction in over-enforcement harm that
may be purchased with the cost savings from adding per se rules of
illegality is large, then it is optimal to divide conduct between per se
rules of illegality and rules of reason.
Proposition 6: The case 𝑓(0) < 𝜌 and 𝑓 ? (0) < −[𝜌 − 𝑓(0)] holds
only if 𝐵 is neither too small nor too large. If 𝐵 is too small, then 𝑓(0) >
𝜌, and, if it is too large, then 𝑓 ? (0) > −[𝜌 − 𝑓(0)] and, in this latter
case, per se rules of illegality cannot minimize error costs.
253. See Katsoulacos & Ulph, On Optimal Legal Standards for Competition Policy,
supra note 109, at 424–45; Kwak, supra note 109, at 383–84.

2021]

A MODEST ANTITRUST

Discussion:
constraint,

D$
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D$

= 𝑓$? (𝑅) DG. From the general form of the budget

&

= " ) ($)(&#- ) > 0. For constant rule coverage, an in(

creasing budget always allows more funding to be plowed into increasing rule of reason intensity. First it is necessary to show that a
D$
small 𝐵 may cause 𝑓(0) < 𝜌 to fail. Because 𝑓$? (𝑅) < 0 and DG > 0,
𝑓(𝑛, ) is falling in 𝐵. This means that it may be the case that for sufficiently small 𝐵, 𝑓(0) > 𝜌. The idea here is that when the enforcement
budget is very small, the budget may be insufficient to purchase
enough rule of reason intensity to make a rule of reason achieve lower
error costs than would subjecting all conduct to per se rules of illegality. It is now necessary to show that a large 𝐵 may cause 𝑓 ? (0) <
−[𝜌 − 𝑓(0)] to fail. It was observed above that 𝑓(𝑛, ) is falling in 𝐵. As
a result, −[𝜌 − 𝑓(0)] becomes more negative as 𝐵 increases, and may
cause a violation of the condition 𝑓 ? (0) < −[𝜌 − 𝑓(0)]. The idea here
is that when the enforcement budget is very large, a high intensity may
be purchased even when all conduct is subject to rules of reason. As a
result, the increase in error costs associated with reducing the amount
of conduct subject to rules of reason to make way for a marginal increase in the amount of conduct subject to per se rules of illegality is
large, and the reduction in error costs from purchasing additional intensity with the cost savings associated with the marginal increase in
the amount of conduct subject to per se rules of illegality must be high
indeed in order to offset them. □
There will indeed be both a floor and a ceiling required for 𝐵 in
order for 𝑓(0) < 𝜌 and 𝑓 ? (0) < −[𝜌 − 𝑓(0)] to hold in the case of the
two functional forms of 𝑓(𝑛, ) considered below. If 𝐵 satisfies these
conditions, then subjecting at least some conduct to per se rules of illegality is appropriate.
Consider now the particular functional forms for rule of reason
error costs and enforcement costs described in Assumption 6. The
(&#- )"
forms are 𝐶(𝑅) = 𝐶$ 𝑅 and 𝑓(𝑛, ) = G#"( - $ (𝑉( + 𝑉) ). The conditions
# (

𝑓(0) < 𝜌 and 𝑓 ? (0) < −[𝜌 − 𝑓(0)] are satisfied for
!" +!!
!"

J𝐶$ + K𝐶$@ −

!"
!" +!!

"$ (!" +!! )
!"

<𝐵<

𝐶2 𝐶$ L. Indeed, because 𝑓 ? (𝑛, ) < 0 over 𝑛, ∈

[0,1] for this functional form, the 𝑛,∗ that globally minimizes error cost
can be found. It is 𝑛∗ =

* (,-*# )%
G#I# $
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and 𝑅 > 2. However, 𝐶$ can be larger than its minimum, in which case
𝑛∗ is defined for larger Ρ. Increases in Ρ reduce the ceiling on 𝐵 because as 𝑉( gets large the error cost of per se rules of illegality increases, requiring bigger gains from rule of reason intensity in order
to be justified.
!
Note that under Assumption 6, 𝑓(0) > 𝜌 implies that !! > 𝑅 − 1,
"

which is the condition for subjecting all conduct to per se rules of illegality to be optimal given the cost functions described by Assumption
6.
D. GRAPHICAL EXPOSITION OF THE MODEL

Figure 2
The fundamental elements of the model can be understood
through Figure 2. The figure shows the lower bounds of 𝑝, and 𝑝,, —
the share of the value of good conduct erroneously condemned and
the share of the value of bad conduct that escapes condemnation,
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respectively—along with the budget constraint in 𝑝,, , 𝑝, space, with
the origin chosen, in nonstandard fashion, to occupy the upper left
corner of the graph. As I do throughout this Article, I will refer to 𝑝,
loosely as the amount, rather than the share of the value, of good conduct erroneously condemned and to 𝑝,, loosely as the amount, rather
than the share of the value, of bad conduct that escapes condemndation.
If the economy is at the origin, then the antitrust laws operate
perfectly with respect to the conduct at issue (namely, conduct that
the Court believe to be ambiguous in character, as described in Part
III): the antitrust laws neither err in condemning good conduct nor in
allowing bad conduct to go unpunished. ab gives the lower bound on
𝑝,, ; it represents the combinations of over-enforcement (𝑝, ) and under-enforcement (𝑝,, ) error when the antitrust laws applicable to the
conduct at issue contain no per se rules of illegality, just rules of reason and per se rules of legality. Moving from right to left, the line veers
toward 𝑝,, because, as rules of per se legality are converted to rules of
reason, the amount of bad conduct that escapes condemnation falls
but the amount of good conduct erroneously condemned increases.
This tradeoff between under-enforcement error and over-enforcement error exists because rules of reason are not perfect and will err
to some extent with respect to both good conduct and bad conduct.
One cannot, however, travel all the way along that line. The segment 𝑎𝐵 is unattainable because rules of reason are assumed to fail to
identify equal amounts of good conduct and bad conduct. As we move
along ab starting from point b, which is the point at which all bad conduct escapes condemnation and so is the point at which the antitrust
laws contain only rules of per se legality, per se rules convert to rules
of reason until a point—𝐵—is reached at which the antitrust laws contain only rules of reason. The amounts of good conduct erroneously
condemned and bad conduct uncondemned are equal at point 𝐵, because, as just mentioned, rules of reason, by assumption, have the
same level of error with respect to bad conduct and good conduct.
𝐵 lies at the intersection of ab with dc because dc gives the lower
bounds of 𝑝, —the combinations of over-enforcement and under-enforcement error attainable when there are no per se rules of legality—
and so dc must also contain a point, corresponding to an antitrust regime with only rules of reason, at which over-enforcement and underenforcement error are equal. It follows, further, that the best possible
position attainable by the economy—that with the lowest possible error costs thanks to pervasive employment of rules of reason—must be
the point, 𝐵, at which dc and ab intersect. It follows that the segments
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𝑎𝐵 and 𝑐𝐵, which represent the continuation of the trips along ab and
dc, respectively, past point 𝐵, are not attainable. Those segments represent points that could only be attained were rules of reason to exhibit only one kind of error—only to erroneously condemn good conduct in the case of segment 𝑎𝐵 and only to allow bad conduct to escape
condemnation in the case of segment 𝑐𝐵.
The 45-degree line, db, gives the points attainable when no rules
of reason are employed and only rules of per se legality or illegality
are employed. Moving from left to right, the slopes of lines dc, ad, and
db give the direction in which the economy will move in response to a
particular rule conversion, regardless of the initial mix of antitrust
rules employed (regardless, that is, of the starting point of the economy). dc shows the direction in which the economy will move if a per
se rule of illegality is converted to a rule of reason. ab shows the direction in which the economy will move if a rule of reason is converted to
a per se rule of legality. And db shows the direction in which the economy will move if a per se rule of illegality is converted to a per se of
legality. Thus if the economy were to start at point 𝐴 and a per se rule
of illegality were converted to a rule of reason, the economy would
move in an upper-rightward direction at a slope equal to the slope of
line 𝑑𝑐 (this movement from point 𝐴 is not pictured). By following
these slopes in the opposite direction, from right to left, one can trace
the movement of the economy in response to the reverse of these rule
changes. Thus, if a rule of reason were converted to a per se rule of
illegality, the movement from point 𝐴 would be opposite, in a lowerlefthand direction, again at a slope equal to the slope of dc (also not
pictured).
So far the discussion has been limited to theoretically attainable
points, without consideration of the budgets of enforcers, which limit
the mix of rules that can effectively be employed by antitrust and
therefore limits the set of points that the economy can actually attain.
The bold line containing point A gives the points closest to point (0,0)
attainable for the particular budget level used for this figure. The slope
of the line is determined by the relative costs of rules of reason, per se
rules of illegality, and per se rules of legality.
The point where the budget line intersects dc corresponds to a
mix of per se rules of illegality and rules of reason (but not per se rules
of legality), because 𝑑𝑐 gives points attainable without use of that rule.
The location of that intersection point on dc is determined by the
budget. A larger budget allows “purchase” of more rules of reason and
an intersection point that is closer to point B, the point at which all
conduct is subject to rules of reason alone.
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The point where the budget line intersects ab corresponds to a
mix of rules of reason and per se rules of legality, but not per se rules
of illegality, because 𝑎𝑏 gives points attainable without use of per se
rules of illegality. The precise mix is here again determined by the size
of the budget, with larger budgets enabling the imposition of more
rules of reason and the attainment of a point along 𝑎𝑏 that is closer to
point 𝐵, the point at which all ambiguous conduct is subject to the rule
of reason.
Because per se rules of illegality are more costly than per se rules
of legality, it follows that a given budget will be able to afford fewer
rules of reason when per se rules of illegality are used than when per
se rules of illegality are not used and so the intersection of the budget
line with 𝑎𝑏, the line that shows points attainable without use of rules
of per se illegality, will be closer to the origin than the intersection of
the budget line with 𝑑𝑐. As a result, the intersection points of the
budget line with 𝑑𝑐 and 𝑎𝑏 will not be symmetrical, and so the budget
line will not lie at a 45-degree angle to the axes. (This is a bit difficult
to see in the figure as drawn.)
Putting all this together, the set of attainable points are all those
falling on or within the trapezoid formed by 𝑑𝑏, the line containing
point 𝐴 (the budget line), and the sections of 𝑑𝑐 and 𝑎𝑏 connecting the
two. The regions bounded by 𝑑𝐵, 𝐵𝑏, and the axes are not attainable
at any budget level.
Increases in rule of reason intensity change this picture. An increase in rule of reason intensity makes the rule of reason more accurate, and so it allows less bad conduct to go uncondemned and erroneously condemns less good conduct. That brings lines dc and ab
closer to the 𝑝, and 𝑝,, axes respectively, and brings their intersection
point, point 𝐵, closer to point (0,0), the point of perfect enforcement
at which all bad conduct is condemned and no good conduct is erroneously condemned. Increases in rule of reason intensity are costly,
and so they will also affect the location of the budget line.
What is the point, out of the set of attainable points, that would
maximize error costs (i.e., minimize harm to consumers)? To answer
that question, it is necessary to consider the relative magnitudes of the
harm inflicted on consumers by bad conduct and the benefits conferred on consumers by good conduct, 𝑉) and 𝑉( , respectively. The dotted grey lines represent points of equal consumer harm after taking
these relative magnitudes into account. Harm, and hence error cost,
falls as the economy moves from line to line in the direction of point
(0,0). As the magnitude of the harm inflicted by bad conduct increases,
these lines become steeper. The slope pictured here is large enough to
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support a no-per-se-rules-of-legality optimum, because the lowest
harm attainable on the budget line (the line containing point 𝐴) is that
at which the budget line intersects line dc, which is the no-per-serules-of-legality line.
If there were no budget constraint, but rule of reason intensity
were fixed, preventing the Court from using per se rules to finance
greater rule of reason intensity in the way described in Section IX.C,
then the Court could apply the rule of reason to all conduct, confident
that enforcers would be able fully to enforce the rule. The economy
would, then, be at point 𝐵. Even then, however, point 𝐵 would minimize error costs only if the slope of the dotted harm lines, which represent points of equal harm, were not to exceed the slope of dc. If they
were to do that, which would happen if bad conduct were very, very
harmful to the economy, relative to the benefits of good conduct, then
point d, which represents the application of per se rules of illegality to
all conduct, would be optimal.254 That is not, however, pictured in Figure 2. In the figure, the dotted lines are not terribly steep, and it is clear
that point 𝐵, if attainable, would correspond to a dotted error cost line
that is closer to point (0,0) than is the dotted line that crosses point 𝑑.

254. For a discussion of this result, see supra Section III.B.

